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Element of the 
Federal Water 
Pollution Offense
by Jeffrey G . Miller
Jeffrey G . Miller is Professor of Law 
Emeritus at Pace Law School .
Summary
This Article, the second in a series of five, examines the 
meaning of “pollutant” under the Clean Water Act . 
Congress and EPA have defined “pollutant” to mean a 
list of specific substances and broad categories of mate-
rials and wastes discharged into water, e .g ., “biologi-
cal materials” and “chemical wastes .” The definition 
is broad enough to encompass virtually all substances 
associated with human activity that are discharged to 
water, regardless of whether the substances cause pollu-
tion or are produced through human endeavor . There-
fore, “pollutant” is rarely a limiting element . Instead, 
the issues with the definition of “pollutant” primarily 
address whether it includes material used in common 
and productive activities, such as adding hatchery-
raised fish (“biological material”) to trout streams or 
spraying pesticides to suppress disease-bearing mos-
quitoes (“biological material” or “chemical wastes”) . 
EPA can easily fix these and other problems by a bet-
ter regulatory definition .
I. Introduction
The Clean Water Act (CWA)1 prohibits “the discharge of 
any pollutant by any person,” unless in compliance with 
several listed sections in §301(a) .2 The listed sections autho-
rize the issuance of two types of CWA permits and specify 
their substantive requirements .3 In §502(12) the statute 
defines “discharge of a pollutant” to mean “any addition of 
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source .”4 
In sum, the subsection prohibits (1) any addition (2) of any 
pollutant (3) to navigable waters (4) from any point source 
(5) by any person, except in compliance with a CWA per-
mit . U .S . Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has 
called this the “core command” of the CWA .5 This is the 
second in a series of five articles examining how the U .S . 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the courts 
have interpreted the initial four jurisdictional elements 
of the federal water pollution control offense from 1972 
to 2012 .6 The first four articles in the series examine each 
of the first four elements, and a fifth article explores dif-
ferences in the techniques courts have used to interpret 
them . Disputes over the interpretations of these elements 
have produced a steady stream of reported decisions since 
the initial implementation of the statute . Even after four 
decades, many of the issues are unresolved and new issues 
continue to surface .
These articles have two purposes . The first is to provide 
definitive analyses of the initial four elements . Because 
many of the most difficult issues under several of the ele-
ments arise from the same fact patterns, one hypothesis is 
that examining these elements in depth in the same project 
will make it easier to resolve the common issues . Because 
many EPA and judicial interpretations obscure elements 
by conflating them with other elements, another hypoth-
esis is that examining each element alone and in depth will 
illuminate its singular meaning and its relations with other 
elements . The second purpose is to explore the methods 
1 . Clean Water Act, 33 U .S .C . §§1251-1387, ELR Stat . FWPCA §§101-607 .
2 . 33 U .S .C . §1311(a) .
3 . The U .S . Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issues permits un-
der CWA §402, 33 U .S .C . §1242, to regulate water pollution, and the 
U .S . Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) issues permits under CWA 
§404, 33 U .S .C . §1344, to regulate the filling of wetlands and other 
navigable waters .
4 . 33 U .S .C . §1362(12) .
5 . Coeur Alaska, Inc . v . Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U .S . 
261, 298 (2009) . The author has elsewhere called the subsection “the basic 
prohibition” of the CWA . See Jeffrey G . Miller et al ., Introduction 
to Environmental Law: Cases and Materials on Water Pollution 
Control 141 (2008) .
6 . The other elements of the offense are similarly deserving of individual analy-
sis, but space constraints preclude their discussion in this Article . The au-
thor’s analysis of the “addition” element of the offense was published in an 
earlier issue of ELR News & Analysis . See Jeffrey G . Miller, Plain Meaning, 
Precedent, and Metaphysics: Interpreting the “Addition” Element of the Clean 
Water Act Offense, 44 ELR 10770 (Sept . 2014) .
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that EPA and the courts have used to interpret the ele-
ments . One hypothesis is that the very different natures 
of the four elements will result in different frequencies of 
judicial challenges, different ratios of expansive to narrow 
interpretations, and different interpretive devices used by 
the courts . Another hypothesis is that statutory interpreta-
tion is dynamic: both the interpretations of the elements 
and the methods used to interpret them evolve over time, 
reflecting the maturation of the statute and developments 
in jurisprudence .
The CWA defines pollutant to mean a list of 18 spe-
cific substances and categories of substances “discharged 
into water,” with two specific exclusions in §502(6) . The 
categories include biological and radioactive materials, 
and solid, chemical, industrial, municipal, and agricul-
tural wastes . While many substances may not initially 
fall into one of these categories, once such materials are 
discharged into water, most become waste and then fall 
within one of the waste categories . As a consequence, it is 
difficult to imagine a substance discharged into water that 
is not included in one of the categories . The definition of 
pollutant is qualitatively different in this regard from the 
definitions of two other elements defined in the CWA, 
“point source” and “navigable water .”7 Both of them 
have statutorily enunciated opposites . “Point sources” are 
confined, discrete conveyances, but the CWA recognizes 
their opposites: nonpoint sources such as surface runoff . 
“Navigable waters” may be a broad term, but the CWA 
recognizes their opposites: non-navigable waters such as 
groundwater . And, of course, water has its opposite: dry 
land . But what is the opposite of a “pollutant”? A sub-
stance that does not pollute? We will see that the U .S . 
Congress divorced the meanings of pollutant and pollu-
tion . Or is the opposite of a pollutant a substance that is 
not listed or not part of a listed category? Name a sub-
stance that does not fall into a listed category when it is 
discharged into water .
The definition of pollutant is extremely broad . As a 
consequence, almost all decisions considering whether a 
particular substance is a pollutant should be answered 
positively . Because it is fairly clear that most substances 
are pollutants, fewer decisions should consider whether 
the pollutant element of the offense is met than whether 
other elements of the offense are met . Finally, most courts 
should use the plain meaning of the definition to deter-
mine whether a substance is a pollutant . Once courts 
have held that a variety of substances are pollutants, 
precedent also should become a frequently used short-
cut interpretive device . Courts should not often engage 
in extensive interpretations of pollutant . The interesting 
pollutant decisions, therefore, will be those holding sub-
7 . CWA §502(7) & (14), 33 U .S .C . §1362(7) & (14) .
stances not to be pollutants and decisions using multiple 
interpretive devices . These decisions should point to the 
fault lines between pollutants and their opposites, what-
ever they are . Or as Supreme Court Justice Sonia Soto-
mayor has commented, they are the “muddy, unclear and 
gray cases .”8
The Article begins by examining congressional actions 
illuminating the meaning of pollutant . It parses the statu-
tory definitions of pollutant and related terms; identifies 
the contexts in which Congress used the term in the stat-
ute and how the term relates to other defined terms in the 
statute; and reviews relevant legislative history . Next, the 
Article catalogues the substances that courts have held are, 
or are not, pollutants; and analyzes EPA and judicial inter-
pretations of pollutant . Finally, the Article identifies and 
discusses prominent or difficult issues that EPA and the 
courts have resolved in their interpretations .
II. Legislative and Administrative 




Although “pollutant” has a familiar common meaning as 
something that pollutes, §502(6) defines it to mean a list 
of 18 specific substances or categories of substances9 “dis-
charged into water,” with two exclusions .10 EPA’s regulatory 
definition is virtually identical .11 Because the definition states 
that pollutant means a list of specific substances or categories 
of substances, the list is an exclusive one and nothing else can 
be a pollutant .12 The exclusive nature of this list is emphasized 
8 . Remarks by Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor at Pace Law School 
(Nov . 12, 2012) (commenting on cases that comprise the Supreme 
Court’s docket) .
9 . CWA §502(6), 33 U .S .C . §1362(6) . Dredged spoil, incinerator residue, 
sewage sludge, munitions, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand 
and cellar dirt (specific substances); solid waste, sewage, garbage, chemical 
wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, industrial, municipal, and 
agriculture waste (categories of substances) . Heat, which is included in the 
list, is not a substance or material, although it could be a waste . Some of the 
substances on the list could be considered either a material or a category of 
material, e .g ., dredged spoil or sewage .
10 . Id. The exclusions are: (1) sewage from vessels regulated by CWA §312, 
33 U .S .C . §1322; and (2) water, gas, or other material pumped into wells 
to facilitate production of petroleum products or pumped onto wells for 
disposal of wastes pursuant to state permits .
11 . It adds “filter backwash” to and drops “cellar dirt” from the list, quali-
fies “radioactive materials” as those not regulated under the Atomic 
Energy Act, 42 U .S .C . §§2011 et seq ., and restates the two exceptions 
in minor ways .
12 . An exclusive definition, using “means,” is confined to the specifics of the 
definition, while an inclusive definition, using “includes,” is not . See Sierra 
Club, Lone Star Chapter v . Cedar Point Oil Co ., Inc ., 73 F .3d 546, 565, 26 
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Author’s Note: The author thanks Laura Young, Pace 2014, for her 
help in completing the research and analysis for and editing of the 
Article and Christina Swatzell, Pace 2012, for her help in initial 
research and analysis for the Article.
by its contrast with the only other statutory definition of an 
element containing a list, the definition of “point source,” 
which “includes” a nonexclusive list of examples . Although 
the definition of pollutant is an exclusive one, meaning only 
the specific substances or categories of substances listed, 
the categories are broad enough to cover virtually all sub-
stances and wastes generated by human activity .13 Because 
of the specificity of the listed substances and the breadth of 
the listed categories, courts should interpret the definition by 
using plain meaning more often than using other devices for 
statutory construction .14 For the same reasons, courts should 
hold most substances to be pollutants, except under unusual 
circumstances . As discussed below, one such circumstance is 
when another statute regulates the substance or the activity 
producing it, potentially creating a conflict between applica-
tion of the two statutes .
2. Toxic Pollutant
The CWA also defines “toxic pollutant” in §502(13) .15 It 
might be assumed that the CWA regulates only substances 
that have some toxic effect . This is not the case, however, 
because substances Congress listed as pollutants include 
nontoxic substances, e .g ., rock and sand . Indeed, by defin-
ing and using the phrase “toxic pollutant,” Congress iden-
tified a subset of pollutants subject to advanced pollution 
control . While §301(a) declared it illegal to discharge any 
pollutant except in compliance with a permit, and §301(b)
(a) established treatment requirements for the discharge of 
all pollutants, §§301(b)(2)(A) and 307(a) established more 
stringent pollution control for the discharge of toxic pol-
lutants . A substance may be a pollutant without being a 
toxic pollutant, although a substance may not be a toxic 
pollutant without being a pollutant .16
3. Pollution
The absence of any reference to pollution in the defini-
tion of “pollutant” has occasionally confused lawyers and 
judges because the common understanding of pollutant 
ELR 20522 (5th Cir . 1996) . The difference is emphasized for the definition 
of pollutant because it contained an inclusive list in its U .S . Senate version, 
but was changed to contain an exclusive list in the Conference Committee . 
See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A . Garner, Reading Law: The Interpreta-
tion of Legal Texts 132-33 (2012) .
13 . The breadth of the categories included in the list “tends to eviscerate any 
restrictive effect” of the definition . See Cedar Point, 73 F .3d at 565; see also 
National Wildlife Fed’n v . Gorsuch, 693 F .2d 156, 172, 13 ELR 20015 
(D .C . Cir . 1982) .
14 . The author’s research has found that courts used plain meaning in 55 of the 
68 decisions interpreting “pollutant .”
15 . The term “means those pollutants or combinations of pollutants  .  .  . which 
 .   .   . cause death, disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic muta-
tions, physiological malfunctions  .  .  . or physical deformations, in such or-
ganisms or their offspring .”
16 . Dague v . City of Burlington, 732 F . Supp . 458, 469-70, 20 ELR 21001 
(D . Vt . 1989), aff’d, 935 F .2d 1343, 21 ELR 21133 (2d Cir . 1991), rev’d 
on other grounds, 505 U .S . 557, 22 ELR 21099 (1992) . In Headwaters, Inc. 
v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F .3d 526, 532-33, 31 ELR 20535 (9th Cir . 
2001), the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit commented regard-
ing a pesticide that “it would be absurd to conclude that a toxic chemical 
directly poured into water is not a pollutant .”
is a substance that causes pollution . The plain mean-
ing of pollutant, however, is not relevant to interpreting 
the term as it is used in the CWA, because the statute 
specifically states that “[e]xcept as otherwise specifi-
cally provided, when used in this [statute]  .  .  . [t]he term 
‘pollutant’ means  .   .   .” the definition discussed above . 
Other parts of the statute support the inapplicability of 
the plain meaning of pollutant in the CWA . The list of 
materials or categories of materials that are pollutants 
includes substances that in the common understanding 
do not pollute, for example, rock, sand, and some bio-
logical material such as indigenous live fish . Few would 
argue that their favorite waterway is free of pollutants or 
pollution only when it is without native fish swimming 
in it or a sand or rock bottom . Congress was aware of the 
concept of pollution when it drafted the CWA; indeed, 
Congress defined pollution and used it in the title17 and 
throughout the statute .18 The CWA defined pollution as 
the “man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, 
biological, and radiological integrity of water,”19 without 
mentioning pollutant . Thus, Congress decoupled “pollut-
ant” and “pollution” by defining each without reference 
to the other . A “pollutant” is a substance falling within 
a statutory list of substances or categories of substances, 
without regard to whether it causes pollution . “Pollution” 
is a negative effect on the integrity of water caused by 
human activity, without regard to whether it is caused by 
a pollutant . It is worth noting that plain meaning is use-
ful in interpreting the words used in the statutory defini-
tion of pollutant, although it is not useful in interpreting 
the word pollutant as it is used in the statute .
B. Legislative History
The legislative history of the CWA indicates that Con-
gress intended its definition of pollutant to be expansive, 
leaving EPA with the authority to define what the term 
means under particular circumstances . Section 502(6) 
incorporated the definition of pollutant from the U .S . 
Senate bill, S . 2770, with a few changes .20 The Senate 
17 . The original Federal Water Pollution Control Act was enacted on June 30, 
1948, c . 758, 62 Stat . 1155, and was amended several times before the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972, Oct . 18, 1972, Pub . 
L . No . 92-500, cast the statute substantially in its present form . The Clean 
Water Act Amendments of 1977, Dec . 27, 1977, Pub . L . No . 95-217, made 
some mid-course corrections to the 1972 legislation . The statute has com-
monly been referred to thereafter as the Clean Water Act .
18 . For instance, the first section used “pollution” six times, CWA §101, 33 
U .S .C . §1251, and the penultimate section used it four times, CWA §60, 
33 U .S .C . §1386 .
19 . CWA §502(19) .
20 . The enacted statutory definition eliminated from the Senate’s version “but 
not limited to” after “means,” and “other waste” after “agricultural waste .” S . 
Rep . No . 1236 (Conf . Rep .), at 143-44 (1972), 1 Legis . Hist . 281, 326-27 . 
The U .S . Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit commented that “while  .  .  . 
the elimination of [these phrases] may be interpreted as an attempt to limit 
the scope of the definition  .  .   . we think that the retention of such broad 
terms in the definitions suggests that the conference committee may have 
determined that the eliminated phrases were simply redundant,” in view of 
the broad coverage of “‘solid waste,’  .  .  . ‘chemical wastes,’ ‘biological materi-
als,’  .  .  . and ‘industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste .  .  .  .’” Sierra Club, 
Lone Star Chapter v . Cedar Point Oil Co ., Inc ., 73 F .3d 546, 566, 26 ELR 
Copyright © 2014 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
11-2014 NEWS & ANALYSIS 44 ELR 10963
Committee Report accompanying S . 2770 indicated that 
the Senate bill defined pollutant to avoid litigation over 
whether particular materials were subject to CWA juris-
diction, suggesting a broad interpretation of the term . 
That suggestion is supported by the Committee’s explicit 
adoption of “the basic formula [from the Refuse Act, but 
adding]  .   .   . municipal discharges to it, so [that] before 
any material can be added to navigable waters authoriza-
tion must first be granted by the Administrator .”21 The 
Refuse Act of 189922 was indeed broad, prohibiting the 
discharge of “any refuse matter of any kind or description 
whatever” to navigable water or its tributaries without a 
permit, with the exception of liquid waste from streets 
or sewers .23 Adding discharges from streets and sewers 
to the Refuse Act’s already expansive concept of regu-
lated substances provided the CWA with an even broader 
reach of “pollutant .”
On the Senate floor, Sen . Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) asked 
Sen . Edmund Muskie (D-Me .), the author and chief 
sponsor of the CWA in the Senate, whether “pollutant” 
included fish parts discharged in various marine environ-
ments . Senator Muskie replied: “I do not get into the busi-
ness of defining or applying these definitions to particular 
kinds of pollutants . That is an administrative decision to 
be made by the Administrator [of EPA] .”24 Courts have 
generally recognized the authority of EPA to define “pol-
lutant” and other jurisdictional terms of §301(a),25 based 
on this and similar evidence .26 In National Wildlife Federa-
tion v. Gorsuch, the U .S . Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia (D .C .) Circuit stated: “Strong signals in the 
Congressional history [indicate] that [Congress] entrusted 
EPA with at least some discretion which ‘pollutants’ 
and sources of pollutants were to be regulated under the 
NPDES program .”27
20522 (5th Cir . 1996) . See also National Wildlife Fed’n v . Gorsuch, 693 
F .2d 156, 173, 13 ELR 20015 (D .C . Cir . 1982) .
21 . S . Rep . No . 92-414, 1972 U .S .C .C .A .N . 3742 (emphasis added) . See 
United States v . Hamel, 551 F .2d 107, 110-11, 7 ELR 20253 (6th Cir . 
1977) .
22 . 33 U .S .C . §407 (emphasis added) . The Refuse Act provided the model for 
the permit program established in CWA §402 .
23 . See United States v . Pennsylvania Indus . Chem . Corp ., 411 U .S . 655, 663-
66, 3 ELR 20401 (1973) (tracing the evolution of the Refuse Act and its 
broad coverage) .
24 . 117 Cong . Rec . 38838 (daily ed . Nov . 2, 1971) .
25 . See Gorsuch, 693 F .2d at 167, 173-74 . Based on a similar congressional 
colloquy, the district court in Natural Res. Defense Council v. Train, 396 F . 
Supp . 1393, 1396, 1401, 5 ELR 20401 (D .D .C . 1975), held that the CWA 
gave EPA discretion to define the meaning of “point source .” The D .C . 
Circuit agreed . See Natural Res . Defense Council, Inc . v . Costle, 568 F .2d 
1369, 1382, 8 ELR 20028 (D .C . Cir . 1977) .
26 . Some courts have articulated their authority to make such determinations 
in the absence of an EPA determination . See, e.g., Sierra Club, Lone Star 
Chapter v . Cedar Point Oil Co ., Inc ., 73 F .3d 546, 26 ELR 20522 (5th Cir . 
1996); U .S . PIRG v . Atlantic Salmon of Maine, LLC, 215 F . Supp . 2d 239, 
246, 32 ELR 20535 (D . Me . 2002) .
27 . See Gorsuch, 693 F .2d at 173 .
III. Judicial Interpretations of Pollutant
A. Substances Held to Be a Pollutant or Not to Be 
a Pollutant
1. Held to Be a Pollutant
Courts have held the following substances to be a “pol-
lutant”: acid mine drainage28; blood29; bombs, ordnance, 
and spent shot30; cement and shotcrete31; changes in water 
conditions32; chemical waste, including chlorine residue 
and alum sludge33; demolition debris34; dredged and fill 
material35; fecal coliform36; live and dead fish, fish parts 
and feces, and shellfish feces37; listed toxic pollutants38; ani-
mal manure39; municipal solid waste40; pesticides, pesticide 
28 . Committee to Save Mokelumne River v . East Bay Mun . Util . Dist ., 13 F .3d 
305, 24 ELR 20225 (9th Cir . 1993); Beartooth Alliance v . Crown Butte 
Mines, 904 F . Supp . 1168, 26 ELR 20639 (D . Mont . 1995) .
29 . United States v . Plaza Health Laboratories, 3 F .3d 643, 23 ELR 21526 (2d 
Cir . 1993) .
30 . Weinberger v . Barcelo-Romero, 456 U .S . 305, 309, 12 ELR 20538 (1982) 
(bombs); Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, Inc . v . New York Athletic Club, 
1996 WL 131863 (S .D .N .Y . 1996) (spent shot and target fragments) .
31 . United States v . Pozsgai, 999 F .2d 719, 23 ELR 21012 (3d Cir . 1993) (con-
crete rubble and cement blocks); United States v . Schalloom, 998 F .2d 196 
(4th Cir . 1993) .
32 . National Wildlife Fed’n v . Gorsuch, 530 F . Supp . 1291, 12 ELR 20268 
(D .D .C . 1982), rev’d, 693 F .2d 156, 13 ELR 20015 (D .C . Cir . 1982); 
South Carolina Wildlife Fed’n v . Alexander, 457 F . Supp . 118, 8 ELR 20757 
(D .S .C . 1978) .
33 . U .S . Steel Corp . v . Train, 556 F .2d 822, 7 ELR 20419 (7th Cir . 1977); 
Hudson River Fishermen’s Ass’n v . City of New York, 751 F . Supp . 1088, 21 
ELR 20647 (S .D .N .Y . 1990) .
34 . United States v . Bradshaw, 541 F . Supp . 880, 12 ELR 20629 (D . Md . 
1981) .
35 . Coeur Alaska, Inc . v . Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U .S . 
261, 302-03 (2009); Rapanos v . United States, 547 U .S . 715, 723, 745, 36 
ELR 20116 (2006); Leslie Salt Co . v . United States, 55 F .3d 1388, 1391, 25 
ELR 21046 (9th Cir . 1995); Town of Norfolk v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
968 F .2d 1438, 1445, 22 ELR 21337 (1st Cir . 1992); Bersani v . EPA, 850 
F .2d 36, 39, 18 ELR 20874 (2d Cir . 1988); United States v . Brink, 795 
F . Supp . 2d 565, 575 (S .D . Tex . 2011); Gouger v . U .S . Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 779 F . Supp . 2d 588, 603 (S .D . Tex . 2011); Alabama Rivers Alli-
ance v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 697 F . Supp . 2d 1251, 1258 (N .D . Ala . 
2009); D’Olive Bay Restoration and Pres . Comm ., Inc . v . U .S . Army Corps 
of Eng’rs, 513 F . Supp . 2d 1261, 1268 (S .D . Ala . 2007); Florida Wildlife 
Fed’n v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 401 F . Supp . 2d 1298, 1308 (S .D . Fla . 
2005); City of Shoreacres v . Waterworth, 332 F . Supp . 2d 992, 1015 (S .D . 
Tex . 2004); National Wildlife Fed’n v . Norton, 332 F . Supp . 2d 170, 185 
(D .D .C . 2004); Kentuckians for Commonwealth, Inc . v . Rivenburgh, 204 
F . Supp . 2d 927, 932, n .5 (S .D . W . Va . 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 317 
F .3d 425 (4th Cir . 2003) .
36 . North Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass’n v . Holly Ridge Assocs ., LLC, 278 F . 
Supp . 2d 654 (E .D .N .C . 2003) (soil and vegetation) .
37 . National Wildlife Fed’n v . Consumers Power Co ., 657 F . Supp . 989, 17 
ELR 20801 (W .D . Mich . 1987) (live fish, dead fish, and fish parts), rev’d on 
other grounds, 862 F .2d 580, 19 ELR 20235 (6th Cir . 1988); U .S . PIRG v . 
Atlantic Salmon of Maine, LLC, 215 F . Supp . 2d 239, 32 ELR 20535 (D . 
Me . 2002) (non-native live fish, fish feces); contra Association to Protect 
Hammersley, Eld, and Totten Inlets v . Taylor Res ., Inc ., 299 F .3d 1007 (9th 
Cir . 2002) (shellfish feces) .
38 . Dague v . City of Burlington, 732 F . Supp . 458, 469-70, 20 ELR 21001 (D . 
Vt . 1989) .
39 . Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v . Southview Farm, 34 F .3d 
114, 24 ELR 21480 (2d Cir . 1994) (cow manure); Higbee v . Starr, 598 F . 
Supp . 323 (W .D . Ark . 1984) (hog manure); United States v . Frezzo Bros ., 
461 F . Supp . 266, 9 ELR 20139 (E .D . Pa . 1978), aff’d, 602 F .2d 1123, 9 
ELR 20556 (3d Cir . 1979) (composted horse manure) .
40 . Resource Invs ., Inc . v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 151 F .3d 1162, 28 ELR 
21407 (9th Cir . 1998) .
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waste, and pesticide residue41; petroleum products42; pro-
duced water43; rock, rubble, bricks, and sand44; sediment45; 
sewage46; soil and vegetation47; and stormwater .48
2. Held Not to Be a Pollutant
Courts have held the following substances not to be a “pol-
lutant”: air pollutants49; changes in water condition50; clear 
water51; pesticides, pesticide wastes and pesticide residue52; 
radioactive materials53; rock and sediment in stormwater54; 
41 . National Cotton Council of Am . v . U .S . EPA, 553 F .3d 927, 39 ELR 20006 
(6th Cir . 2009) (sprayed pesticide residue and waste); Headwaters, Inc . v . 
Talent Irrigation Dist ., 243 F .3d 526, 31 ELR 20535 (9th Cir . 2001) .
42 . United States v . Eidson, 108 F .3d 1336, 27 ELR 20853 (11th Cir . 1997); 
United States v . Hamel, 551 F .2d 107, 7 ELR 20253 (6th Cir . 1977) .
43 . Produced water is pumped from groundwater or accompanies other prod-
ucts produced by drilling (e .g ., oil and gas) . Northern Plains Resource 
Council v . Fidelity Exploration and Dev . Co . 325 F .3d 1155 (9th Cir . 2003) 
(unaltered groundwater); Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v . Cedar Point Oil 
Co ., Inc ., 73 F .3d 546, 26 ELR 20522 (5th Cir . 1996) (produced water or 
its constituents) .
44 . Coeur Alaska, Inc . v . Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U .S . 
261, 268 (2009) (crushed rock); United States v . Pozsgai, 999 F .2d 719, 23 
ELR 21012 (3d Cir . 1993) (concrete rubble, cement blocks); Minnehana 
Creek Watershed Dist . v . Hoffman, 597 F .2d 617, 9 ELR 20334 (8th Cir . 
1979) (rock and sand used in constructing dam and rip rap); Kentuckians 
for Commonwealth, Inc . v . Rivenburgh, 204 F . Supp . 2d 927, 932, n .5 
(S .D . W . Va . 2002) (mining overburden agreed by parties to be a pollut-
ant), rev’d on other grounds, 317 F .3d 425 (4th Cir . 2003); Hanson v . United 
States, 710 F . Supp . 1105, 19 ELR 21074 (E .D . Tex . 1989) (dirt, rock, 
bricks); United States v . Bradshaw, 541 F . Supp . 880, 12 ELR 20629 (D . 
Md . 1981 (demolition debris and sand) .
45 . Borden Ranch P’ship v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F .3d 810, 32 ELR 
20011 (9th Cir . 2001) (soil and vegetation); United States v . Deaton, 209 
F .3d 331, 30 ELR 20508 (4th Cir . 2000) (soil); Driscoll v . Adams, 181 F .3d 
1285, 29 ELR 21387 (11th Cir . 1999) (sand and silt were the two primary 
constituents of sediment); United States v . Wilson, 133 F .3d 251, 28 ELR 
20299 (4th Cir . 1997) (native soil); Rybachek v . EPA, 904 F .2d 1276, 20 
ELR 20973 (9th Cir . 1990) (dirt and gravel); United States v . M .C .C . of 
Florida, Inc ., 772 F .2d 1501, 15 ELR 21091 (11th Cir . 1985) (vegetation 
and sediment); Hughey v . JMS Dev . Corp, 78 F .3d 1523, 26 ELR 20924 
(11th Cir . 1996) (sediment in rainwater flowing from construction site); 
Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist., 597 F .2d 617 (rock and sand); Tungett v . 
Papierski, 2006 WL 51148 (E .D . Tenn . 2006) (sediment, soil, dirt); North 
Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass’n v . Holly Ridge Assocs ., LLC, 278 F . Supp . 
2d 654 (E .D .N .C . 2003) (soil, sand, and dirt); Pronsolino v . Marcus, 91 F . 
Supp . 2d 1337, 30 ELR 20460 (N .D . Cal . 2000); Bradshaw, 541 F . Supp . 
880 (demolition debris and sand) .
46 . United States v . Gulf Park Water Co. 972 F . Supp . 1056 (S .D . Miss . 1997) .
47 . Borden Ranch, 261 F .3d 810 (vegetation); M.C.C. of Florida, 772 F .2d 1501 
(sea grass); Tungett, 2006 WL 51148 (trees, organic debris) .
48 . Driscoll, 181 F .3d 1285; Hughey, 78 F .3d 1523 (construction site runoff); 
United States v . Frezzo Bros ., 461 F . Supp . 266, 9 ELR 20139 (E .D . Pa . 
1978) (mushroom growing waste runoff), aff’d, 602 F .2d 1123, 9 ELR 
20556 (3d Cir . 1979) .
49 . U .S . EPA ex rel . McKeown v . Port Auth . of New York and New Jersey, 162 
F . Supp . 2d 173 (S .D .N .Y . 2001) . See also Chemical Weapons Working Grp . 
v . Dep’t of Army, 111 F .3d 1485, 27 ELR 21130 (10th Cir . 1997) .
50 . National Wildlife Fed’n v . Gorsuch, 693 F .2d 156, 13 ELR 20015 (D .C . 
Cir . 1982); contra South Carolina Wildlife Fed’n v . Alexander, 457 F . Supp . 
118, 8 ELR 20757 (D .S .C . 1978) .
51 . Orleans Audubon Soc’y v . Lee, 742 F .2d 901, 15 ELR 20030 (5th Cir . 
1984) .
52 . Fairhurst v . Hagener, 422 F .3d 1146 (9th Cir . 2005); Peconic Baykeeper, 
Inc . v . Suffolk Cnty ., 585 F . Supp . 2d 377 (E .D .N .Y . 2008), rev’d in part, 
600 F .3d 180 (2d Cir . 2010); Altman v . Town of Amherst, New York, 190 
F . Supp . 2d 467 (W .D .N .Y . 2001), rev’d, 47 Fed . Appx . 62 (2d Cir . 2002) .
53 . Train v . Colorado PIRG, 426 U .S . 1, 6 ELR 20549 (1976); Waste Action 
Project v . Dawn Mining Corp., 137 F .3d 1426, 28 ELR 21035 (9th Cir . 
1998) .
54 . Kentuckians for Commonwealth, Inc . v . Rivenburgh, 317 F .3d 425 (4th 
Cir . 2003); Town of Norfolk v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 968 F .2d 1438, 
and shellfish parts and feces .55 For four of these seven sub-
stances there are contrary decisions . Ten of the 13 narrow 
interpretations were rendered in citizen suits56 and nine of 
the 13 were decided during or after 1996 .57 Most of the 
negative decisions were grounded on avoiding interference 
with pervasive regulation by another statute of the sub-
stance at issue or the activity producing it .
B. Listed Substances Versus Listed Categories of 
Substances
Some decisions held a substance to be a pollutant because 
it is specifically listed in the definition of pollutant .58 
But most decisions held a substance to be a pollutant 
because it fell within a category of substance listed in the 
definition,59 frequently biological material,60 or chemical,61 
agricultural,62 solid,63 or industrial waste .64 “Biological 
22 ELR 21337 (1st Cir . 1992); United States v . United Homes, Inc ., 1999 
WL 117701 (N .D . Ind . 1999) . The court did not address whether contami-
nated river water was a pollutant in Hudson River Fishermen’s Ass’n v. City of 
New York, 751 F . Supp . 1088, 1102, 21 ELR 20647 (S .D .N .Y . 1990), aff’d 
without opinion, 940 F .2d 649, 21 ELR 21226 (2d Cir . 1991) .
55 . Association to Protect Hammersley, Eld, and Totten Inlets v . Taylor Res ., 
Inc ., 299 F .3d 1007 (9th Cir . 2002); contra National Wildlife Fed’n v . Con-
sumers Power Co ., 862 F .2d 580, 19 ELR 20235 (W .D . Mich . 1987); U .S . 
PIRG v . Atlantic Salmon of Maine, LLC, 215 F . Supp . 2d 239, 32 ELR 
20535 (D . Me . 2002) .
56 . The author’s research has found that, by contrast, 34 of the 68 decisions 
interpreting pollutant were citizen suit cases .
57 . By contrast, the author’s research has found that 37 of the 68 decisions were 
during or after 1996 .
58 . See, e.g., Weinberger v . Barcelo-Romero, 456 U .S . 305, 309, 12 ELR 20538 
(1982) .
59 . Congress’ use of “broad generic terms” indicated legislative intent to capture 
as pollutants more than the substances specifically listed . See United States v . 
Hamel, 551 F .2d 107, 7 ELR 20253 (6th Cir . 1977); Hudson River Fisher-
men’s Ass’n, 751 F . Supp . at 1101 .
60 . National Cotton Council of Am . v . U .S . EPA, 553 F .3d 927, 39 ELR 20006 
(6th Cir . 2009) (biologically based pesticides); Consumers Power, 862 F .2d 
580 (live fish, dead fish, and fish parts); North Carolina Shellfish Growers 
Ass’n v . Holly Ridge Assocs ., LLC, 278 F . Supp . 2d 654 (E .D .N .C . 2003) 
(fecal coliform); Atlantic Salmon of Maine, 215 F . Supp . 2d 239 (fish feces); 
National Wildlife Fed’n v . Consumers Power Co ., 657 F . Supp . 989, 17 
ELR 20801 (W .D . Mich . 1987) (live fish, dead fish, and fish parts); United 
States v . Frezzo Bros ., 461 F . Supp . 266, 9 ELR 20139 (E .D . Pa . 1978) 
(composted horse manure) . In the district court decision upheld in Hamel, 
551 F .2d at 110, “the government contended successfully  .  .  . that gasoline 
could be subsumed under ‘biological materials,’’’ although the appeals court 
upheld the decision on a different basis .
61 . National Cotton Council, 553 F .3d 927 (chemical pesticide residue); Head-
waters, Inc . v . Talent Irrigation Dist ., 243 F .3d 526, 31 ELR 20535 (9th Cir . 
2001) (chemical pesticide residue); Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v . Cedar 
Point Oil Co ., Inc ., 73 F .3d 546, 26 ELR 20522 (5th Cir . 1996) (produced 
water); U .S . Steel Corp . v . Train, 556 F .2d 822, 7 ELR 20419 (7th Cir . 
1977) (steel-making waste); North Carolina Shellfish Growers, 278 F . Supp . 
2d 654; Dague v . City of Burlington, 732 F . Supp . 458, 20 ELR 21001 (D . 
Vt . 1989), aff’d, 935 F .2d 1343, 21 ELR 21133 (2d Cir . 1991), rev’d on 
other grounds, 505 U .S . 557, 22 ELR 21099 (1992) (leachate from landfill) .
62 . Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v . Southview Farm, 34 
F .3d 114, 24 ELR 21480 (2d Cir . 1994) (cow manure); Atlantic Salmon of 
Maine, 215 F . Supp . 2d at 246 (waste from fish farm); Higbee v . Starr, 598 
F . Supp . 323 (W .D . Ark . 1984) .
63 . United States v . Schallom, 998 F .2d 196 (4th Cir . 1993) (sand and cement); 
Higbee, 598 F . Supp . 223 .
64 . Northern Plains Resource Council v . Fidelity Exploration and Dev . Co ., 
325 F .3d 1155 (9th Cir . 2003) (produced water from gas extraction); Unit-
ed States v . Eidson, 108 F .3d 1336, 27 ELR 20853 (11th Cir . 1997) (tank 
bottoms pumped from gas station); Cedar Point, 73 F .3d 546 (produced 
water from oil drilling) .
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material” covers all living or formerly living carbonaceous 
matter, including substances in fossilized form such as a 
fossil fuel . “Solid waste,” “chemical waste,” “industrial, 
municipal, and agricultural waste,” however, describe the 
byproducts or leftover results of human activity . Indeed, 
they cover most conceivable byproducts and residuals of 
human activity . Moreover, once most non-waste materials 
are discharged to water, they become waste . For instance, 
commercially valuable petroleum products become waste 
when they are spilled from a vessel at sea . Although not 
noted in the decisions, a substance could fall into more 
than one listed category . Leftover tar from road paving, 
for instance, could be biological material, chemical waste, 
solid waste, municipal waste, and industrial waste . In the 
few decisions holding a substance not to be a pollutant, the 
substance at issue might have fit within a listed category, 
but the court nevertheless held it not to be a pollutant for 
other reasons .65
1. Waste Categories Versus Material Categories
Most of the broad categories of pollutants are designated 
“waste(s)” or “materials .”66 Although the CWA does not 
define either term, material is a broader category than 
waste .67 Material describes the substance before, during, 
and after human use and even a substance that is not 
associated with human use .68 Waste, on the other hand, 
describes material that remains after human use or after 
abandonment without use, such as oil spilled from a ves-
sel at sea .69 One court, however, has held that both waste 
65 . For instance, in Association to Protect Hammersley, Eld and Totten Inlets v. 
Taylor Res., Inc., 299 F .3d 1007 (9th Cir . 2002), the Ninth Circuit held that 
feces and shells from mussel-growing and harvesting facilities were not pol-
lutants, although they were biological material . The court was largely moti-
vated by the incongruity of holding the byproducts of shellfish propagation 
to be pollutants, when the goal of the CWA is to protect and promote the 
propagation of fish and shellfish . The Supreme Court in Train v. Colorado 
PIRG, 426 U .S . 1, 6 ELR 20549 (1976), and the Ninth Circuit in Waste 
Action Project v. Dawn Mining Corp., 137 F .3d 1426, 28 ELR 21035 (9th 
Cir . 1998), held radioactive source, byproduct and special nuclear materials 
not to be pollutants, despite the specific listing of “radioactive materials” in 
the CWA definition of “pollutant,” because those radioactive materials were 
already regulated by the Atomic Energy Act, which Congress intended to be 
the sole regulator of such materials .
66 . “Materials” are listed in the plural . “Chemical wastes” is in the plural, but 
the other categories of waste are in the singular . There is no apparent reason 
why some of the categories are singular and others plural . None of the courts 
interpreting pollutant found this difference to be significant nor do any of 
them note that a party to the cases argued the difference was meaningful . 
This may not be surprising because in the absence of a contrary indication 
in the statute, the singular includes the plural and the plural includes the 
singular . See Scalia & Garner, supra note 12, at 129-31, where the authors 
trace this canon back to Blackstone and Bentham and a 1278 English case . 
See also 1 U .S .C . §1, which provides that unless otherwise provided, singu-
lar nouns in the United States Code include the plural and vice versa .
67 . For instance, hazardous materials regulated by the Hazardous Materi-
als Transportation Act, 49 U .S .C . §§5101 et seq ., are more extensive, see 
§5102(2) and §5103(a), than hazardous wastes regulated by RCRA, 42 
U .S .C . §6903(5) .
68 . “Material” means “(1) the elements, constituents, or substances of which 
something is composed or can be made (2) matter that has qualities which 
give it individuality and by which it may be categorized .” Merriam-Web-
ster’s Collegiate Dictionary 715 (10th ed .) .
69 . “Waste” means “damaged, defective, or superfluous material produced by a 
manufacturing process: as  .  .  . (3) an unwanted by-product of a manufactur-
and material must be associated with human or industrial 
activity to be a pollutant, using the ejusdem generis70 canon 
of construction and noting that the substances listed in 
the definition of pollutant were associated with human or 
industrial activity .71 That analysis, however, is flawed, as 
discussed below .72
Why does the definition of pollutant include all mate-
rial of a biological nature, but only waste material of a solid, 
chemical, industrial, municipal, or agricultural nature? 
When do the latter materials become waste? Although the 
case law does not directly address these questions under 
the CWA, a few decisions examine whether particular 
substances are solid waste under the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA),73 the statute primarily 
designed to regulate the management and disposal of solid 
and hazardous waste . Whether a substance is a solid waste 
under RCRA has proven to be one of the most difficult 
legal questions under that statute,74 suggesting the question 
could be a difficult one under the CWA .
a. Biological Materials
The term “biological material” raises dilemmas that courts 
have addressed directly or indirectly . The U .S . Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit used plain meaning to hold 
that fish parts and whole fish, dead or alive, were biological 
material and therefore pollutants in National Wildlife Feder-
ation v. Consumers Power Co .75 There, an electric-generation 
facility withdrew water with live whole fish from a lake, 
ran the water through a turbine to produce electricity, and 
discharged the water back into the lake with a puree of dead 
fish parts, dead fish, and some live fish . A district court fol-
lowed the Sixth Circuit’s lead, holding that a salmon farm 
discharged pollutants, including live fish .76 Finally, in Asso-
ing process, chemical laboratory or nuclear reactor  .  .  . refuse from places of 
human or animal habitation  .  .  . Garbage: Rubbish (2) Excrement  .  .  . Sew-
age .” Id. at 1329 . See Northern Plains Research Council, 325 F .3d at 1161 .
70 . The ejusdem generis canon has been defined in a treatise as “[i]nterpret[ing] 
a general term to reflect the class of objects reflected in the more specific 
terms accompanying it .” See William N . Eskridge Jr ., Dynamic Statu-
tory Interpretation 323 (1987) .
71 . Association to Protect Hammersley, Eld, and Totten Inlets v . Taylor Res ., 
Inc ., 299 F .3d 1007 (9th Cir . 2002) .
72 . For instance, while some sand and rock, listed as pollutants, may be associ-
ated with human activity, most are not .
73 . Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U .S .C . §§6901-
6992k, ELR Stat . RCRA §§1001-11011 .
74 . RCRA defines “solid waste” in 42 U .S .C . §6904; EPA elaborates the defi-
nition in 40 C .F .R . §261 .2 . Under RCRA, hazardous waste is a subset of 
solid waste . Determining whether material is a solid waste is often the most 
difficult legal issue under RCRA, primarily because one person’s waste is 
often another person’s raw material . See Jeffrey G . Miller & Craig N . 
Johnston, The Law of Hazardous Waste Disposal and Remediation 
149-71 (2d ed .) . RCRA also regulates the disposal of nonhazardous solid 
waste, but not as comprehensively as hazardous waste .
75 . National Wildlife Fed’n v . Consumers Power Co ., 862 F .2d 580, 583, 19 
ELR 20235 (6th Cir . 1988) . The Sixth Circuit had earlier held oil to be a 
pollutant, although by a more circuitous route because oil is a biological 
material, perhaps hoping to avoid the question of whether fish and people 
are pollutants under the CWA . United States v . Hamel, 551 F .2d 107, 7 
ELR 20253 (6th Cir . 1977) .
76 . U .S . PIRG v . Atlantic Salmon of Maine, LLC, 215 F . Supp . 2d 239, 246-48, 
32 ELR 20535 (D . Me . 2002) .
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seeds there; the operation included both production and 
harvesting .81 Finally, Congress made it clear in §31882 that 
discharges from aquacultural activities are subject to con-
trol by §402 permits, just as are discharges from concen-
trated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) .83 Both of those 
operations are very similar to growing and harvesting mus-
sels in a confined area . Because the CWA does not define 
“aquaculture,” a defendant might argue that it means only 
raising fish, not shellfish . But the dictionary definition of 
the word is the “culture of sea, lake and river foodstuffs, as 
fish, oysters, seaweed, etc .”84 Moreover, the CWA considers 
protection of fish and shellfish in the same phrases .85
The Ninth Circuit’s “absurd results” reasoning in Ham-
mersley may appear to be more difficult to dismiss . The 
court noted that the purpose of the CWA is to “provide for 
the  .  .  . propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife .”86 The 
defendant’s activity included propagation of shellfish, a goal 
that the CWA specifically espouses rather than an activ-
ity that the CWA specifically prohibits or regulates . But 
the CWA translates the goal elsewhere as “the propagation 
of a balanced, indigenous population of shellfish, fish and 
wildlife .”87 Under the facts of the case, the mussels probably 
are not indigenous and the defendant’s activities, therefore, 
may interfere with a balanced population of shellfish and 
fish .88 The distinction is not necessary, however, because 
Congress made it clear in §318 that aquacultural activi-
ties are subject to regulation by §402 permits, overcom-
ing any contrary inferences from the goals of the statute . 
The applicable canon of interpretation is that the specific 
(§318’s specification that aquacultural activities must have 
§402 permits) governs over the general (§101(a)’s policy of 
providing for the propagation of fish and shellfish) .
Under the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Consumers Power, 
a state fish hatchery would need a §402 permit to stock 
the state’s streams with native trout . Surely, Congress did 
not intend that result . Perhaps, this is a perfect dilemma 
for EPA to resolve by amending its definition of pollutant 
to exclude indigenous live fish or by issuing a general per-
mit authorizing federal and state fish and game authorities 
to add hatchery-raised indigenous fish stock to navigable 
water . While the Agency is rulemaking on fish and shell-
81 . The operation was conducted from a raft and consisted of planting mussel 
seeds on ropes hung from the bottom of the raft and anchored on the bot-
tom . Mussels grew on the ropes, which were hoisted on board the raft at 
intervals for harvesting . Hammersley, 299 F .3d at 1016 .
82 . 33 U .S .C . §1328 . See 40 C .F .R . §122 .24(a) . EPA may designate aquacul-
ture operations as point sources requiring permits .
83 . Section 502(6) includes CAFOs within the list of example point sources .
84 . See Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary of the English Language 135 
(1958) . “The science, art and business of cultivating marine or freshwater 
foodfish or shellfish, such as oysters, clams, salmon and trout, under con-
trolled conditions .” See American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 89 (4th ed .) .
85 . CWA §§101(a) & 316(a), 33 U .S .C . §§1251(a) & 1326(a) .
86 . CWA §101(a)(2), 33 U .S .C . §1251(a)(2) .
87 . CWA §316(a), 33 U .S .C . §1326(a) (emphasis added) . Although this lan-
guage is specified for the control of thermal discharges, it is an apt amplifica-
tion of the statutory goal and there is no reason to believe Congress’ concern 
for indigenous fish was confined to their survival from changes in heat .
88 . Association to Protect Hammersley, Eld, and Totten Inlets v . Taylor Res ., 
Inc ., 299 F .3d 1007, 1010 n .1 (9th Cir . 2002) .
ciation to Protect Hammersley, Eld, and Totten Inlets v. Tay-
lor Resources, Inc .,77 the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit found “biological material” to be ambiguous, pos-
sibly meaning all biological material or just biological waste 
resulting from human or industrial activity . It held that 
mussel shells and feces from a mussel-harvesting operation 
were not pollutants because one purpose of the CWA was 
the propagation of shellfish .78 Although the reasoning of 
Hammersley is flawed, as discussed immediately below, the 
three decisions can perhaps be reconciled if the lake fish in 
Consumers Power were indigenous, the salmon in Atlantic 
Salmon were not indigenous, and the origin of the mus-
sels in Hammersley was ambiguous . Such a reconciliation of 
the decisions would serve the statutory purpose of provid-
ing a “balanced, indigenous population of fish, shellfish and 
wildlife,”79 although none of the courts made this distinc-
tion or suggested any other reconciliation . Giving meaning 
to the distinction between indigenous and non-indigenous 
species, however, would raise the subsidiary question of 
how long species must be in place to be indigenous .
In Hammersley the court held mussel shells and feces 
from a mussel-harvesting operation were not pollutants, 
even though they were biological material, because to be 
a pollutant, a substance must be a waste from a human or 
industrial activity . It came to that conclusion using two 
interpretive devices: ejusdem generis and avoiding absurd 
results .80 Ejusdem generis posits that if a statute lists exam-
ples of regulated substances, other substances must be 
of the same nature as the listed substances to be regu-
lated by the statute . The court observed that the examples 
listed in the definition of “pollutant” were all wastes from 
human or industrial activity and that the mussel shells 
and feces were not, hence the shells and feces could not 
be “pollutants .”
The court was wrong on several counts . First, the statu-
tory definition listed “biological material,” not “biological 
waste .” As discussed above, “material,” of course, is differ-
ent from and extends beyond “waste .” Congress’ use of both 
material and waste in its list of substance categories that are 
pollutants suggests that it knew the difference between the 
words and intended different results by using them . Sec-
ond, all of the other substances listed are not waste from 
human activity . Rock and sand are listed, and while they 
may be waste from human activity, most often they are not . 
In any event, the relation to human activity need not be 
reflected in the nature of a pollutant, because it is already 
captured in the clause “by any person” in §301(a) . Third, 
although mussel shells and feces are not man-made, their 
presence in large quantities at the harvesting operation was 
man-induced . Indeed, the term used by the court for the 
defendant’s activity, “harvesting operation,” is significant, 
for the mussels did not grow of their own accord on the 
operation’s equipment, instead the defendant planted their 
77 . 299 F .3d 1007 (9th Cir . 2002) .
78 . Id. at 1015-17 .
79 . CWA §316(a), 33 U .S .C . §1326(a) (emphasis added) .
80 . Hammersley, 299 F .3d at 1016 .
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fish, it might as well include people so that water theme 
parks do not need §402 permits for waterslides into lakes 
and rivers . EPA already has promulgated a permit by rule 
for burial at sea under the Ocean Dumping Act, demon-
strating that it is possible to acknowledge that human bod-
ies are pollutants, but allowing a desirable body-disposal 
activity to continue under conditions that will ensure that 
it is not harmful to human health or the environment .89 If 
EPA can do so for human bodies under the Ocean Dump-
ing Act, surely it can do so for live fish and human swim-
mers under the CWA . EPA might be tempted instead to 
promulgate an exclusion from requiring a permit in 40 
C .F .R . §122 .3 for the same activity . This is not as wise a 
course as the other options, however, because, as discussed 
below, courts have repeatedly held that EPA does not have 
the power to exempt from the permit program any dis-
charges that the statute requires to have a permit .
b. Consumer Products
One of the most frequently litigated issues in the interpre-
tation of pollutant is whether a consumer product becomes 
a waste when it is used for its intended purpose .90 The ques-
tion arises because a product’s intended use may bring it to 
rest in navigable water without further human interven-
tion . Most products become waste when we throw them 
away after use (for example, when we throw paper into the 
waste basket or leave our garbage cans on the street for 
municipal collection), or abandon them after use or even 
before use (for example, when we spill unused oil from a 
vessel at sea) . But some products, such as bullets or pesti-
cides, come to rest in navigable water because we use them 
for their intended purposes . Does firing a bullet at a duck 
flying over water constitute the addition of a solid or chem-
ical waste to that water when we do not hit the bird? How 
can firing a bullet at a bird, the intended use of the bul-
let, constitute disposal of a waste or addition of a waste to 
water? Courts have held that substances can be pollutants 
no matter how useful they are,91 and that the purpose of a 
substance is irrelevant to whether it is a pollutant .92
The Supreme Court addressed a similar question under 
the Refuse Act, holding in United States v. Standard Oil 
Co. that commercially valuable aviation fuel became 
refuse,93 indeed became a pollutant,94 once it was spilled 
into water . Oil and hazardous substance spill cases under 
the CWA generally involve this same principle because 
89 . Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U .S .C . §§1401 et seq . 
For Ocean Dumping Act, see §1412 . EPA’s regulations, 40 C .F .R . §229 .1, 
authorize burial at sea of bodies, cremated ashes, and accompanying flowers 
and decomposable wreathes, subject to conditions on location .
90 . The same issue arises under RCRA .
91 . See, e.g., Hudson River Fishermen’s Ass’n v . City of New York, 751 F . Supp . 
1088, 1101, 21 ELR 20467 (S .D .N .Y . 1990) .
92 . See, e.g., Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist . v . Hoffman, 597 F .2d 617, 626-
27, 9 ELR 20334 (8th Cir . 1979) .
93 . “There is nothing more deserving of the label ‘refuse’ than oil spilled into a 
river .” United States v . Standard Oil Co ., 384 U .S . 224, 229-30 (1966) .
94 . “The word ‘refuse’ includes all  .  .  . pollutants apart from those flowing from 
streets and sewers and passing there-from in a liquid state .” Id. at 230 .
commercially valuable oil or chemicals are abandoned 
when they are spilled and are no longer useful products .95 
Once a bullet misses the waterfowl it was aimed at and falls 
into the water, it too becomes refuse . Neither the owner of 
the spilled oil nor of the errant bullet intended to throw it 
away or intended it to enter water . But by the very act of 
spilling the substance in water or firing it over water, the 
substance lost its value, and the owner abandoned it to fall 
into water .96
i. Munitions
The Supreme Court acknowledged that a bomb dropped 
into ocean water when it missed its target on a practice 
range was a pollutant because the definition of pollutant 
includes “munitions,” and bombs are “munitions .”97 The 
first cases in the civilian arena in which this issue sur-
faced were suits by environmental groups under the CWA 
and RCRA against gun ranges for discharging spent lead 
shot and skeet target fragments into Long Island Sound 
and other water bodies .98 The plaintiffs challenged these 
operations, in part, on the ground that the defendants were 
point sources adding pollutants to navigable water with-
out a CWA permit . The amounts of lead some gun ranges 
added to the environment were enormous .99
Courts had no trouble finding that the spent shot “which 
lands in navigable waters constitutes a pollutant within the 
meaning of the CWA,”100 effectively meaning that it fell 
within the chemical or solid waste categories in the CWA’s 
definition of pollutant . Courts had considerably more 
trouble determining whether the spent shot was a solid 
waste under RCRA,101 an elaborately defined term under 
95 . See, e.g., United States v . Hamel, 551 F .2d 107, 7 ELR 20253 (6th Cir . 
1977) .
96 . The analogy is not exact, however, for the spilled oil was never used for its 
intended purpose, while the bullet may have been used for its intended 
purpose, if the intended purpose was to be fired at a bird and to hit a bird 
over or near water .
97 . Weinberger v . Barcelo-Romero, 456 U .S . 305, 308-09, 12 ELR 20538 
(1982) . The Court describes the district court’s holding that bombs are pol-
lutants because bombs are munitions, and munitions are included on the 
exclusive list of pollutants in CWA §502(6) . The Court did not question 
that holding .
98 . Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v . Remington Arms Co ., 989 F .2d 
1305, 1313, 23 ELR 20699 (2d Cir . 1993); Long Island Soundkeeper 
Fund, Inc . v . New York Athletic Club, 1996 WL 131863 (S .D .N .Y . 1996) .
99 . For instance, at one gun range, 2,400 tons (nearly five million pounds) of 
lead shot had been discharged on surrounding land and water . Connecticut 
Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F .2d at 1308 .
100 . Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, 1996 WL 131863 at *15 .
101 . RCRA defines “hazardous waste” as a subset of “solid waste,” 42 U .S .C . 
§6903(5) . It then defines “solid waste” as “discarded material,” 42 U .S .C . 
§6903(27), but it also charges EPA with the responsibility to define hazard-
ous waste, which carries with it the responsibility to define solid waste, 42 
U .S .C . §6921 . EPA’s regulatory definitions of solid and hazardous waste are 
narrower than the statutory definitions . In Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s 
Ass’n, 989 F .2d 1305, the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held 
that lead shot fired at a rifle range met RCRA’s congressional definition of 
solid waste, leaving open the question of whether it met EPA’s regulatory 
definition . The significance between the different statutory and regulatory 
definitions is that material must meet the statutory rather than the nar-
rower regulatory definition of solid waste to provide courts with jurisdiction 
for citizen suits seeking to remediate imminent and substantial endanger-
ment of health or the environment from solid or hazardous waste under 42 
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that statute . Neither RCRA’s statutory definition nor EPA’s 
regulatory definition of solid waste under RCRA specifi-
cally addressed whether lead shot fired at a rifle range was 
or became a solid waste . But EPA consistently interpreted 
its RCRA regulatory definition of solid waste to exclude 
consumer products when used for their intended purposes 
and particularly to exclude spent ammunition .102 Indeed, 
it promulgated a RCRA rule to define when spent military 
munitions are and are not solid waste, specifying that they 
are not solid waste when they are “used for their intended 
purpose .”103 It could be argued that because the RCRA 
regulation addresses only military munitions and not civil-
ian munitions, spent civilian munitions are still pollutants . 
The logic of the regulation, however, applies equally to mil-
itary and civilian spent munitions .104 Should solid waste be 
defined identically under RCRA and the CWA? Because 
their goals are both to protect public health and the envi-
ronment, arguably they should be, but that would require 
EPA rulemaking under the CWA .
ii. Pesticides
The issue of whether consumer products used for their 
intended purposes are wastes when discharged into water 
arises in other contexts, particularly with regard to the 
application of pesticides in or near an aquatic environ-
ment . Decisions involving such releases are complicated 
by the relevance of another statute administered by EPA, 
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA),105 governing the registration and use of pesticides 
(insecticides, fungicides, or rodenticides) . To register a pes-
ticide, EPA must approve uses that can be made of the pes-
ticide and directions for applying the pesticide; thereafter, 
both are required to be printed on the label .106 In deciding 
whether to register a pesticide, what uses to allow for it, 
and what methods of application to require for it, EPA is to 
“prevent unreasonable adverse effects on the environment,” 
including water .107 FIFRA prohibits the distribution, sale, 
or use of an unregistered pesticide or the use of a registered 
pesticide unless in compliance with EPA-approved uses 
and directions for its application .
U .S .C . §6972(a)(1)(B), but must meet the narrower regulatory definition 
of solid waste to provide courts with jurisdiction for citizen suits against 
disposal of hazardous waste without or in violation of a RCRA permit under 
42 U .S .C . §6972(a)(1)(A) . The court later decided in Cordiano v. Metacom 
Gun Club, Inc., 575 F .3d 199 (2d Cir . 2009), that such lead shot was not a 
RCRA solid waste within EPA’s regulatory definition . The end result is that 
plaintiffs may bring citizen suits against gun clubs for causing an imminent 
and substantial endangerment of health or the environment, regardless of 
whether they are violating RCRA, but not against the gun clubs for operat-
ing without or in violation of a RCRA permit .
102 . Cordiano, 575 F .3d at 207-09 .
103 . 40 C .F .R . §266 .202 .
104 . Why did EPA not cover both military and civilian munition in the same 
rule? Could it be that the U .S . Department of Defense’s lobbying carries 
greater weight than the NRA’s lobbying?
105 . Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U .S .C . 
§§136-136y, ELR Stat . FIFRA §§2-35 .
106 . FIFRA §3(c)(1)(C), 7 U .S .C . §136a(c)(C) .
107 . FIFRA §§2(j) & 3(a), 7 U .S .C . §§136(j) & 136a(a) .
When public health officials in and around New York 
City discovered in 2000 that mosquitoes carried the newly 
arrived and deadly West Nile virus, they ordered the spray-
ing of pesticides to eradicate mosquitoes . Because mos-
quitoes breed in water, the resulting campaign sprayed 
pesticides over and near open water and wetlands . In No 
Spray Coalition v. City of New York,108 environmental 
groups brought a CWA citizen suit to enjoin the spray-
ing, arguing that it would damage the environmental 
and public health, but would be ineffective in suppressing 
West Nile virus . The district court, apparently irked by the 
plaintiff’s attempt to interfere with the implementation of 
public health protection measures,109 refused to issue an 
injunction, in part because Congress did not intend plain-
tiffs to use the CWA citizen suit provision to enforce prohi-
bitions of FIFRA, which had no such provision . Although 
the court did not address whether pesticides, when prop-
erly applied to water according to the approved uses and 
labels, were pollutants, it held that because the pesticides 
were sprayed into the air rather than into the water, they 
were not added to navigable water .110
Shortly thereafter, citizens filed similar suits against 
nearby spraying . In Altman v. City of Amherst,111 the dis-
trict court dismissed the complaint, holding that “pes-
ticides, when used for their intended purpose, do not 
constitute a ‘pollutant’  .   .   . and are more appropriately 
regulated under FIFRA .”112 The court was persuaded that 
because FIFRA had no citizen suit provision, Congress did 
not intend that CWA citizen suits be brought against the 
spraying of pesticides in accordance with label instructions 
approved by EPA under FIFRA . In Peconic Baykeepers, 
Inc. v. Suffolk County,113 another New York federal district 
court conflated “addition” and “pollutant,” stating that: 
“Atmospheric emission of aerial adulticides are not defined 
as pollutants[;] at no time was the spray made directly to 
navigable water .” It held that FIFRA rather than the CWA 
governed and deferred to EPA’s Interpretive Statement (dis-
cussed below) that no CWA permit was required .
The U .S . Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
reversed No Spray, holding that CWA §505 authorized 
plaintiffs to maintain a CWA citizen suit if they alleged 
a violation of the CWA .114 The Second Circuit also 
reversed Altman, because the record was incomplete and 
because the plaintiff had not been able to conduct dis-
covery to make its case that properly applied pesticides 
were pollutants . The Second Circuit stated that the ques-
108 . No Spray Coalition v . City of New York, 2000 WL 1401458 (S .D .N .Y . 
2000), rev’d, 252 F .3d 148, 31 ELR 20707 (2d Cir . 2001) .
109 . The district court noted that the citizens filed suit “despite the unusual una-
nimity of governmental agency opinion that this spraying is in the best in-
terests of preserving public health” and that “[f ]ortunately for the commu-
nity, that question is decided by public health and environmental officials,” 
not by the courts . 2000 WL 1401458 at *1 .
110 . Id. at *3 .
111 . Altman v . City of Amherst, 190 F . Supp . 2d 467 (S .D .N .Y . 2001), rev’d, 47 
Fed . Appx . 52 (2d Cir . 2002) .
112 . Altman, 190 F . Supp . 2d at 471 .
113 . 585 F . Supp . 2d 377 (E .D .N .Y . 2008), rev’d in part, 600 F .3d 180 (2d Cir . 
2010) .
114 . No Spray Coalition, 252 F .3d 148 .
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tion of whether properly applied pesticides could be pol-
lutants under the CWA would remain open unless and 
until EPA articulated an interpretation of the CWA on 
the issue .115 Finally, the Second Circuit in part reversed 
Peconic Baykeepers,116 noting that the Sixth Circuit had 
subsequently overturned EPA’s CWA pesticide exemption 
rule in National Cotton Council,117 discussed below, but 
that the Sixth Circuit had stayed its mandate . Because, on 
the facts found by the district court, some of the defen-
dant’s spraying was not in conformity with the pesticide’s 
FIFRA-approved label, the Second Circuit reversed the 
lower court’s decision to that extent .
In the meantime, two decisions of the Ninth Circuit 
addressed the relationship between the CWA and FIFRA 
in regulating the application of pesticides to navigable 
water in accordance with their EPA-approved labels . In 
Headwaters,118 decided in 2001, an irrigation district added 
a chemically derived herbicide to irrigation canals (consid-
ered navigable waters for the purposes of the case) to kill 
aquatic weeds choking the canals . EPA had registered the 
herbicide under FIFRA for that purpose, and the defen-
dant applied the herbicide in accordance with the instruc-
tions on its EPA-approved label . When the defendant 
added the herbicide to the stream, the active ingredient 
in the herbicide remained in the water after it had served 
its intended purpose . The court held that the remaining 
pesticide was either excess pesticide or pesticide residue, in 
either case a “chemical waste,” and therefore a “pollutant,” 
the discharge of which required a §402 permit .
In a later Ninth Circuit decision, Fairhurst v. Hagener,119 
the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks had 
added a pesticide to streams to kill invasive non-indigenous 
fish for the purpose of restoring the population of indig-
enous fish . EPA had registered the chemically derived pes-
ticide under FIFRA for that purpose, and Montana applied 
the pesticide in accordance with the EPA-approved label . 
As unlikely as it may seem, the uncontested facts estab-
lished that no excess chemical pesticide was discharged 
to the water and that once the pesticide performed its 
intended purpose, there was no residue chemical pesticide 
and hence no chemical waste . At the time that the Ninth 
Circuit considered the issue, EPA had issued an Interpre-
tive Statement and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the 
Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States 
in Compliance With FIFRA .120 Under EPA’s interpre-
tation, pesticides applied for their intended purposes, in 
accordance with their EPA-approved labels, and leaving no 
excess or residue pesticide in the water, were not pollutants 
under the CWA . This was consistent with the Headwaters 
ruling, and the Ninth Circuit deferred to EPA’s interpreta-
115 . Altman v . City of Amherst, 47 Fed . Appx . 52 (2d Cir . 2002) .
116 . Peconic Baykeepers, Inc . v . Suffolk Cnty ., 600 F .3d 180 (2d Cir . 2010) .
117 . 553 F .3d 927, 39 ELR 20006 (6th Cir . 2009) .
118 . 243 F .3d 526, 31 ELR 20535 (9th Cir . 2001) .
119 . 422 F .3d 1146 (9th Cir . 2005) .
120 . Id. at 1149-50 . Indeed, before the district court issued its opinion, EPA had 
issued an Interim Interpretive Statement . The Interim Interpretive State-
ment and the Interpretive Statement were similar in reasoning and conclu-
sion . Both are addressed below .
tion . EPA’s interpretation conceded that excess pesticides 
or residual pesticides are pollutants, but concluded they 
are not added to navigable waters by aerial spraying point 
sources because the point sources spray them into the air, 
not into the water . The Ninth Circuit did not address this 
spraying scenario, however, because it was beyond the facts 
of the case .
EPA ultimately promulgated a CWA rule incorporat-
ing the substance and reasoning of its Interpretive State-
ment .121 The rule exempted from the CWA §402 permit 
program pesticides applied directly to, over, or near 
water in full compliance with FIFRA .122 The Sixth Cir-
cuit resolved challenges to the rule in the most detailed 
decision considering the legality of discharging pesticides 
into water without a CWA permit in National Cotton .123 
EPA began its argument before the court, as it had in the 
preamble to its rule, by stating that pesticides are either 
biological or chemical in composition and can be pollut-
ants only if they are “biological material” or “chemical 
wastes .” It then argued that when chemically derived pes-
ticides are applied for an EPA-approved use, they are not 
chemical wastes . EPA conceded that excess pesticides and 
pesticide residue are pollutants because they are biological 
material or chemical wastes . Finally, it argued that biologi-
cally derived pesticides applied for their EPA-approved use 
cannot be biological material, because it would be absurd 
for biological pesticides applied for their approved use to 
be treated differently than chemical pesticides applied for 
their approved use .124
The Sixth Circuit considered three different dictionary 
definitions of waste, and concluded that under any of the 
definitions, chemical pesticides are not chemical waste, but 
that excess pesticides and pesticide residue “are wastes of 
the pesticide application .”125 Thus far, it agreed with EPA . 
But then EPA argued that the point sources only sprayed 
pesticides into the air for their intended uses; the point 
source did not spray excess pesticides or pesticide residues . 
At the “time of discharge, the pesticide is a non-pollutant 
and the excess pesticide or pesticide residues are not cre-
ated until later, presumably after they are already in the 
water .”126 Therefore, EPA argued that by spraying pesti-
cides, the point source did not spray (add) excess pesticides 
and pesticide residues into water, and thus did not require 
a CWA §402 permit . The court rejected EPA’s assertion 
that “a pesticide must be ‘excess’ or ‘residue’ at the time of 
discharge if it is to be considered as discharged from a point 
121 . 71 Fed . Reg . 68483 (Nov . 27, 2006), codified at 40 C .F .R . §122 .3(h) .
122 . Id. at 68486-87 . The rule was consistent with Fairhurst, in which the Ninth 
Circuit had held that a chemical pesticide applied to water was not a pol-
lutant when no excess or residual pesticide remained in the water . The rule 
is not convincingly consistent with Headwaters, however, because that deci-
sion commented that chemical pesticide excess or residue in water would be 
a pollutant without considering EPA’s argument that the defendant did not 
add the pollutant from a point source .
123 . National Cotton Council of America v . U .S . EPA, 553 F .3d 927, 39 ELR 
20006 (6th Cir . 2009) .
124 . Id. at 934-35 .
125 . Id. at 936, quoting from the preamble of EPA’s rule, 71 Fed . Reg . at 68487 .
126 . Id . at 939 .
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source.”127 The court found that requiring a temporal con-
nection in “the discharge of a pollutant” was “unsupported 
by the Act  .  .  . [and] contrary to the purpose of the permit-
ting program, which is ‘to prevent harmful discharges .’”128 
The court noted that the purpose of the statute was to 
prevent the discharge of pollutants that would harm water 
quality, whether the harm occurred immediately upon dis-
charge or later .129
As to biologically based pesticides, the court could find 
no rationale for holding them not to be “biological materi-
als” rather than falling into a more limited hypothetical 
category such as “biological waste .” Congress specifically 
used the broader “material” category for biological sub-
stances . Treating biological pesticides as pollutants is also 
consistent with the §502(19) definition of pollution, which 
includes the “biological  .   .   . integrity of water,” for “[a]
dding biological pesticides to water undeniably alters its 
biological integrity .”130 Since Congress decoupled “pollut-
ant” from “pollution,” however, this is not overwhelmingly 
persuasive support for the court . Alternatively, it could 
have argued the broader interpretation of biological mate-
rial promotes the objective of the CWA as stated in §101(a) 
“to restore and maintain the  .  .  . biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters .” The court also noted that other courts 
had construed “biological material” broadly to include live 
fish, dead fish, fish parts, and fish feces and urine .131 In 
the end, the court held that pesticide residue or excess was 
unambiguously chemical waste and biological material .132
iii. Water Supply Treatment Residue
Lead shot and pesticides are not the only consumer prod-
ucts that may become pollutants after use for their intended 
purposes . In Hudson River Fishermen’s Association v. City of 
New York,133 the city augmented its water supply in times 
of water shortage by pumping water from the Hudson 
River into an aqueduct, which ultimately discharged the 
water into a reservoir that was part of the city’s water sup-
ply system . The city conceded that the reservoir was navi-
gable water . Because the river water was not clean enough 
to serve as drinking water without treatment, the city 
added alum and chlorine at the pumping station to pre-
cipitate out solids and to kill pathogens as the water made 
127 . Id.
128 . National Cotton Council, 553 F .3d at 939, quoting National Ass’n of Home 
Builders v . Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S . Ct . 2518, 2525 (2007) .
129 . A similar attempt to require a temporal connection between “addition” and 
polluting activities was rejected in American Mining Cong. v. U.S. EPA, 965 
F .2d 759, 764, 22 ELR 21135 (9th Cir . 1992) .
130 . National Cotton Council, 553 F .3d at 938 .
131 . Citing National Wildlife Fed’n v . Consumers Power Co ., 862 F .2d 580, 17 
ELR 20801 (W .D . Mich . 1987); U .S . PIRG v . Atlantic Salmon of Maine, 
LLC, 215 F . Supp . 2d 239, 246, 32 ELR 20535 (D . Me . 2002) . The Sixth 
Circuit distinguished Hammersley, holding mussel feces and shells not to 
be biological material because that decision dealt with the “result of natural 
biological processes, not the result of a transforming human process . See 
National Cotton Council, 553 F .3d at 938 n .6 .
132 . National Cotton Council, 553 F .3d at 940 .
133 . 751 F . Supp . 1088, 21 ELR 20647 (S .D .N .Y . 1990), aff’d without opinion, 
940 F .2d 649, 21 ELR 21226 (2d Cir . 1991) .
its way to the reservoir through the aqueduct . By the time 
the aqueduct discharged the river water to the reservoir, 
the chemicals had performed their intended purposes and 
the aqueduct discharged alum floc (the solids precipitated 
by the alum) and chlorine residual (the chlorine remaining 
after killing the pathogens) to the reservoir, along with the 
treated water . The environmental group sued the city for 
discharging alum floc and chlorine residue to the reservoir 
without a permit .
The city argued it was adding useful chemicals at the 
pumping station to perform a public health benefit, as the 
defendants had argued in the pesticide application cases . 
The district court found that the city’s actions were no dif-
ferent than those of other water treatment plants, which 
commonly added alum to precipitate out solids, which they 
then “filtered out, backwashed from the filter, and disposed 
of as waste .”134 Indeed, water treatment plants routinely 
have CWA §402 permits limiting their discharges of solids 
and alum .135 Chlorine is used to treat publicly owned treat-
ment works (POTWs) effluent for pathogens, and chlorine 
residual is routinely regulated in CWA §402 permits for 
POTWs .136
The city’s argument focused on the wrong substances 
and the wrong receiving water . The city added alum and 
chlorine to the water in the aqueduct at the pumping sta-
tion, at which point they were useful products rather than 
chemical wastes or residues . Moreover, no one contended 
that the water in the aqueduct was navigable . But that was 
not what the plaintiff environmental group challenged; 
instead, it challenged the subsequent discharge of the 
alum sludge and chlorine residual into the reservoir . At 
that point, the reservoir was concededly navigable water 
and the chemicals had served their useful purposes and 
were either excess or residue—chemical wastes in either 
case . The court commented that it “is indisputable that a 
pollutant is a pollutant no matter how useful it may earlier 
have been .”137
iv. Consumer Products as Pollution
Some may wonder why EPA would abandon the envi-
ronmental high road by not regulating the discharges of 
spent lead shot and spent or excess pesticides into water . 
Cynics might conclude that EPA did not want to confront 
the National Rifle Association and the agricultural lobby . 
There is undoubtedly some truth in that . On the other 
hand, it is not clear that Congress intended the CWA to 
regulate additions to water of consumer products whose 
intended use involves addition to water . This ambiguity 
134 . Id. at 1102 .
135 . Id. at 1097-98 .
136 . Interestingly, residual chlorine is limited in terms of both maximum levels 
and minimum levels in POTW effluent . See Russian River Watershed Prot. 
Comm. v. City of Santa Rosa, 142 F .3d 1136, 1139, 28 ELR 21265 (9th Cir . 
1998) . The maximum level, of course, protects life in the receiving water . 
The minimum level ensures that the POTW is adding enough chlorine to 
do its job .
137 . Hudson River Fishermen’s Ass’n v . City of New York, 751 F . Supp . 1088, 21 
ELR 20647 (S .D .N .Y . 1990) .
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also troubles the analyses of the discharges under other ele-
ments of the CWA offense .138
The meaning of waste is inherently uncertain for two 
primary reasons . First, what may be waste to a person 
who is disposing of a substance may be a useful substance 
for another person,139 an issue that has not yet arisen in 
the decisions defining pollutant in the CWA, but under-
lies the issue of defining solid waste in RCRA . Second, 
the intended use of a consumer product may result in the 
product coming to rest in water, for example, spent bullets 
fired at birds over water but missing their targets . These 
and similar cases can be expected to recur in other con-
texts . Under these circumstances, it is curious why EPA 
has not promulgated a rule defining pollutant or waste to 
exclude consumer products, particularly regulated con-
sumer products that are used for their intended purposes, 
or fashioned a general permit or permit by rule to autho-
rize such discharges, as it has done for military munitions 
under RCRA140 or burial at sea of human bodies under 
another statute, as discussed above . Of course, the Agency 
attempted to promulgate a rule exempting pesticide appli-
cations from requiring §402 permits . But early in the 
CWA’s implementation, courts held that EPA could not 
exempt any category of discharges of pollutants from point 
sources to navigable waters from the requirement of secur-
ing a CWA permit .141 It is no surprise that EPA lost its bid 
to promulgate a similar rule exempting discharges of pes-
ticides from the requirement of securing CWA permits .142 
EPA might be more successful using a different regulatory 
strategy, as suggested above .
C. Discharged Into Water
Under §502(6), the listed substances and listed categories 
of substances are pollutants only if they are “discharged 
into water .” But the §301(a) prohibition, elaborated by 
138 . For instance, what are the point sources: the rifle ranges or the rifle bar-
rels? If the latter, is EPA to issue permits to all hunters or rifle owners for 
them to fire over water? That would be a thankless and probably impossible 
task . The analytical problem may be analogous to issues that arise under the 
“addition” element of the offense, where, with respect to aerial spraying of 
pesticides, the addition seems to be to the air rather than to the water . See 
Miller, supra note 6 . In U.S. EPA ex rel. McKeown v. Port Authority of New 
York and New Jersey, 162 F . Supp . 2d 173 (S .D .N .Y . 2001), the plaintiff 
sued to abate pollution from tunnel toll booths . The court commented that 
the pollutants at issue emanated from countless vehicle exhausts rather than 
from the toll booths .
139 . When you leave an unwanted chair at the curbside in front of your house 
and it is taken by someone else for use, it was waste for a moment, but 
not for long . One of RCRA’s objectives is to minimize the disposal of 
waste by encouraging “recycling and reuse .” See 42 U .S .C . §6902(a)(6) . 
Material destined for recycling is waste to the disposer, but a useful mate-
rial to the recycler .
140 . 40 C .F .R . §266 .202, a rule that has survived judicial review . See Military 
Toxics Project v . EPA, 146 F .3d 948, 28 ELR 21350 (D .C . Cir . 1998) .
141 . See National Cotton Council of Am . v . U .S . EPA, 553 F .3d 927, 39 ELR 
20006 (6th Cir . 2009); Northwest Envtl . Advocates v . U .S . EPA, 537 F .3d 
1006, 1021-22 (9th Cir . 2008); Northern Plains Resource Council v . Fidel-
ity Exploration and Dev . Co ., 325 F .3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir . 2003); NRDC 
v . Costle, 568 F .2d 1369, 8 ELR 20028 (D .C . Cir . 1977); Catskill Moun-
tains Chapter of Trout Unlimited v . U .S . EPA, Nos . 08-CV-5606, -8430, 
2014 WL 1284544 (S .D .N .Y . Mar . 28, 2014) .
142 . National Cotton Council, 553 F .3d 927 .
§502(12), already specifies that only the addition of a pol-
lutant from a point source into navigable water is a vio-
lation . The “discharged into water” phrase in §502(6) 
appears to be redundant with the “into  .  .  . water” already 
in §502(12), making the offense: the addition of a pollut-
ant into water from a point source into navigable water . 
This makes no sense . “Water” in “discharged into water” 
is not modified by “navigable,” making “water” a more 
expansive term, perhaps including groundwater . Accord-
ingly, the offense would read as follows: the addition of a 
pollutant into water, including groundwater, from a point 
source into navigable water . That makes no sense either . 
Section 502(16) defines the freestanding “discharge” to 
include “discharge of a pollutant,” which is already defined 
as addition of a pollutant into navigable water from a point 
source in §502(12) . That interpretation would make the 
offense even more circular and nonsensical . Statutes are to 
be interpreted to give every word a meaning143 and to avoid 
redundancies .144 Avoiding the redundancy of “discharge” 
and “water” in §502(6), however, results in circularity, 
absurdity, and nonsense, which are to be avoided even 
more than redundancy .
The analysis is complicated by the fact that Congress 
included a similar redundancy in its definition of “point 
source” to mean exclusively a “discernible, confined and 
discrete conveyance  .  .  . from which pollutants are or may 
be discharged,” with an inclusive list of examples, includ-
ing a pipe, §502(14) . This, together with the “discharged 
into water” phrase in §502(6) makes the offense read: 
the addition of any listed substance into water from a 
pipe from which listed substances are added into navi-
gable waters . This suggests the offense is a two-staged 
activity: the addition of a substance into water, and the 
subsequent addition of their mixture by a conveyance 
into navigable water . While that describes many indus-
trial and municipal effluents, nothing else in the statute 
suggests the prohibition excludes addition of pollutants 
directly into navigable water without first being mixed 
with water .
Perhaps, the drafters of these definitions did not want 
to slander the substances listed as pollutants unless they 
were actually added to navigable water . We do not want 
children to recoil from eating broccoli because it is a “pol-
lutant” (a “biological material”), regardless of whether it 
is discharged into water . Similarly, perhaps the drafters 
did not want to imply that all point sources were illegal 
unless they actually added pollutants to navigable water . 
Such caution was unnecessary, however, because all four 
elements of the offense must be met before a discharge vio-
lates the CWA unless it is in compliance with a permit . 
Although when interpreting a statute we are supposed to 
avoid redundancy and to give meaning to every word, a few 
143 . Senne v . Village of Palentine, Ill., 695 F .3d 617, 621 (7th Cir . 2012) . See 
Scalia & Garner, supra note 12, at 174-79 .
144 . Mackey v . Lanier Collection Agency & Serv ., Inc ., 486 U .S . 825, 837 
(1988) . Eskridge, supra note 70, at 324, citing Kungys v . United States, 
485 U .S . 759, 778 (1988); South Carolina v . Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc ., 
476 U .S . 498, 510 n .22 (1986) .
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redundancies, meaningless words, and scrivener’s errors145 
may be inevitable in a 200-page statute . These redundan-
cies are two of them .
Only two decisions have identified this issue . In the 
first, United States v. Pozsgai,146 the defendants in an 
enforcement action for filling a wetland without a §404 
permit argued that they had not discharged substances 
into water and, therefore, the substances were not pollut-
ants . They argued that the “into navigable waters” phrase 
in §502(12) defined the geographic jurisdictional reach of 
the statute, and the “into water” phrase in §502(6) lim-
ited the definition of “pollutant .” Though it seemed to be a 
clever argument, the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit rejected it in favor of reading “navigable waters” 
in §502(12) to modify “water” in §502(6), an interpreta-
tion it found more consistent with the legislative history .147 
The court’s interpretation, however, is circular and ignores 
the recurrence of similar redundancies in these definitional 
phrases .148 The second decision, Pronsolino,149 was a dispute 
over whether §§303(d) and 319 require total maximum 
daily loads (TMDLs) for water polluted only by nonpoint 
sources . While the California federal district court recog-
nized the issue posed by “into water” in the definition of 
pollutant in §502(6), it did not need to address that issue 
to resolve the TMDL dispute before it .
As much as courts abhor redundancy in statutes, there 
is no apparent way around the redundancy between “into 
navigable water” in §502(12), the primary definition of the 
offense, and “into water” in §502(62), defining an element 
in §502(12) .
D. Must a Pollutant Cause Pollution?
As discussed above, Congress decoupled “pollutant” and 
“pollution” by defining each without reference or regard 
to the other . The §502(6) definition of pollutant does not 
hint that a pollutant is something causing pollution; the 
§502(19) definition of pollution does not hint that pol-
lution is a condition caused by a pollutant . Most courts 
agree .150 Indeed, in an important early decision, National 
Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch,151 the D .C . Circuit deferred 
to EPA’s argument that low dissolved oxygen, cold, and 
oxygen supersaturation resulting from water flowing over 
dams were not pollutants, but instead were “water condi-
145 . See Scalia & Garner, supra note 12, at 234-39 .
146 . 999 F .2d 719, 23 ELR 21012 (3d Cir . 1993) .
147 . Id. at 726-27 .
148 . Section 502(12) similarly defines the “discharge of a pollutant” to mean ad-
dition of a pollutant from a “point source,” which it defines in §502(14) as 
a conveyance from which a pollutant may be “discharged .”
149 . 91 F . Supp . 2d 1337, 30 ELR 20460 (N .D . Cal . 2000) .
150 . Demonstration of a negative impact on water quality is not necessary for a 
substance to be a pollutant . See, e.g., Northern Plains Res . Council v . Fidel-
ity Exploration and Dev . Co ., 35 F .3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir . 2003); Com-
mittee to Save Mokelumne River v . East Bay Mun . Util . Dist ., 13 F .3d 305, 
309, 24 ELR 20225 (9th Cir . 1993); Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist . v . 
Hoffman, 597 F .2d 617, 626-27, 9 ELR 20334 (8th Cir . 1979); U .S . PIRG 
v . Atlantic Salmon of Maine, LLC, 215 F . Supp . 2d 239, 247 n .3, 32 ELR 
20535 (D . Me . 2002); Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, Inc . v . New York 
Athletic Club, 1996 WL 131863 (S .D .N .Y . 1996) .
151 . 693 F .2d 156, 13 ELR 20015 (D .C . Cir . 1982) .
tions,” e .g ., “pollution,” and therefore the dams from which 
these conditions followed did not require §402 permits .
Despite the decoupling of pollutant and pollution, some 
courts have determined particular substances to be pollut-
ants or not to be pollutants in part on the basis of their 
negative impact or lack of negative impact on water quali-
ty .152 Because the overall purpose of the CWA is “to restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integ-
rity of the Nation’s waters”153 and the CWA’s definition of 
pollution is the “man-made or man-induced alteration of 
the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integ-
rity of water,” the very purpose of the CWA, not surpris-
ingly, is to reduce pollution . The frequently used canon of 
construction to interpret a remedial statute to effectuate 
its purpose,154 therefore, suggests that “pollutant” be inter-
preted to accomplish “pollution” control, even though the 
two words are decoupled by their statutory definitions . On 
the other hand, the definition of pollutant is so broad that 
use of this additional canon should not be necessary to 
hold that a substance is a pollutant . Moreover, while the 
fact that a substance causes pollution might suggest that 
the substance is a statutory pollutant,155 the reverse is not 
true . After all, Congress defined pollutant to include sub-
stances not causing pollution, such as rock and sand .
One problem with using the concept of pollution as a 
driver for interpreting pollutant is that the meaning of pol-
lution is not altogether clear . While the statutory defini-
tion of pollution as the “chemical, physical, biological and 
radiological integrity of water” appears meaningful, what 
does it in fact mean? What is water integrity?156 Surely, 
it cannot mean pure water, which scarcely if ever occurs 
in a state of nature and would not nourish fish and shell-
fish if it did . Is water with integrity water as it existed at 
a particular time and place? Before the industrial revolu-
tion? Before the arrival of European colonists in North 
America? Before the arrival of the original colonists in the 
western hemisphere?157 Or does it relate to “the protection 
152 . For decisions where a substance was deemed a pollutant because of negative 
impact on water quality, see Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, 261 F .3d 810, 814-15, 32 ELR 20011 (9th Cir . 2001); and 
United States v. Deaton, 209 F .3d 331, 336, 30 ELR 20508 (4th Cir . 2000) . 
In Hammersley, the Ninth Circuit held that a substance was not a pollutant 
because of its neutral or positive impact on water quality . See Association to 
Protect Hammersley, Eld, and Totten Inlets v . Taylor Resources, Inc ., 299 
F .3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir . 2002) .
153 . CWA §101(a) .
154 . Eskridge, supra note 70, at 327, citing Reves v . Ernst & Young, 494 U .S . 
56 (1990) .
155 . See National Cotton Council of Am . v . U .S . EPA, 553 F .3d 927, 938, 39 
ELR 20006 (6th Cir . 2009) .
156 . The dictionary definition of “integrity” is “unimpaired or unmarred state 
 .  .  . soundness, purity .” Webster’s New Dictionary of the English Lan-
guage 1290 (1958) . Use of the word in the CWA “is intended to convey a 
concept that refers to a condition in which the natural structure and func-
tion of ecosystems is maintained .” H . Rep . No . 92-911, at 76-77 (1972), 
reprinted in 3 Legis . History 753, 763-64 . Query how much help that is . 
Which ecosystem are we protecting? The one that existed before the advent 
of the industrial revolution, or before the introduction of trans-Atlantic 
human immigrants, or before the introduction of Native American immi-
grants, or before the last Ice Age? Ecosystems are constantly evolving even 
without human intervention .
157 . One case from the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit suggests 
that water with integrity means pre-industrial revolution or even pre-human 
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and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and  .  .  . for 
recreation in and on the water,” a goal of the CWA?158 If 
so, which fish and shellfish?159 Indigenous or introduced? If 
indigenous, at what time and for how long?
The concepts of water integrity and water pollution are 
relative, difficult to define, and involve both science and 
policy . Take, for example, nutrients . Nutrients support bio-
logical growth; without nutrients, there would be no fish 
in the streams, lakes, or oceans . But a superabundance of 
nutrients causes algae blooms, which in turn die and exert 
oxygen demand in water to decompose, and if the oxygen 
demand from the algae decomposition is sufficient, there 
will be no oxygen left for fish to survive . There is a dead 
zone in the Gulf of Mexico caused by nutrients flushed 
down the Mississippi River from farmland, cities, and fac-
tories throughout the Midwest .160 No nutrients equates 
to no fish; but too many nutrients also equates to no fish . 
Whether a substance causes pollution is often a situational 
issue and is always a scientific question . To be sure, there 
are some substances that cause harm to health or the envi-
ronment under any circumstances and therefore are pol-
lutants under any circumstances . Examples include PCBs 
or dioxin .
Congress dealt with the ambiguity of water integrity 
by establishing the water quality standards regimen, in 
which states designate the uses they desire to be made of 
particular water bodies (a policy determination), and states 
together with EPA establish the maximum levels or crite-
ria for various pollutants allowed in each water body to 
achieve the designated use (a scientific determination) .161 
Congress provided in the CWA that point sources cannot 
discharge pollutants into a water body that will interfere 
with the designated use of the water by causing an exceed-
ance of the criteria for pollutants in the water body .162
Congress’ decoupling of “pollutant” and “pollution” 
in the definitions of the two words reflects its recognition 
that whether the discharge of a pollutant causes pollution 
depends in part on a political judgment as to what use 
should be made of a particular water body, and in part 
on a scientific expert judgment as to the extent to which 
discharges of pollutants must be curtailed to achieve that 
use . These are the very determinations required to estab-
water . See Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist .v . Hoffman, 597 F .2d 617, 
625, 9 ELR 20334 (8th Cir . 1979) . Self-evidently, the physical, chemical, 
and biological composition of a pre-human river may be purely speculative .
158 . CWA §101(a)(2) .
159 . Section 316(a), 33 U .S .C . §1326(a), may provide some help here by speci-
fying that thermal discharges shall be limited to protect a “balanced, in-
digenous population of fish, shellfish and wildlife .” To be sure, indigenous 
populations change over time .
160 . Friends of the Everglades v . South Florida Water Mgmt . Dist ., 570 F .3d 
1210, 1227 (11th Cir . 2009) .
161 . For a discussion of water quality standards and how they are implemented, 
see Miller et al ., supra note 5, at Chap . V .
162 . Of course, limiting the pollution levels of point sources may not achieve 
the criteria . In that situation, states may limit nonpoint source discharges to 
achieve the criteria . If states refuse to do so, however, the CWA has reached 
the limits of its effectiveness, for it authorizes no federal controls on non-
point sources and no mechanisms to force states to act on them . For a dis-
cussion of the CWA’s limited nonpoint source program, see Miller et al ., 
supra note 5, at Chap . XIII .
lish water quality standards and effluent limitations based 
on them . This was the pre-1972 strategy of federal water 
pollution control . But Congress found the water quality 
approach was cumbersome, resource-intensive for regu-
lators, and slow . Congress therefore enacted the CWA 
in 1972 to simplify and expedite regulation of pollution 
through point sources by the initial substitution, in most 
cases, of technology-based standard regulation for water 
quality-based standard regulation .163 Congress hoped that 
application of the best available water pollution control 
technology to point sources would achieve water quality 
standards in most waterways . But it required permit writ-
ers to establish effluent limitations requiring further treat-
ment where necessary to achieve water quality standards . 
Thus, for courts to ask whether a substance causes environ-
mental harm before holding that it is a pollutant arrogates 
to courts a task that Congress delegated to EPA and the 
states,164 pushing judicial authority beyond its separation-
of-powers limits .
Why do some courts nevertheless continue to examine 
whether substances cause pollution before finding they are 
pollutants? Perhaps, because some judges think it unfair 
to enmesh defendants in the pollution-control regulatory 
system unless their discharges are actually harmful . If so, 
these judges misperceive both the statutory process and 
their role in it . Holding that a substance is a pollutant does 
not enmesh the substance in the pollution-control system . 
That occurs only if all of the other elements of §301(a) are 
met . Moreover, holding that a substance is a pollutant does 
not mean that it will be subject to pollution control even 
if the other elements are met . Water quality standards do 
not require treatment of harmless substances for which 
no criteria exist . And the technology-based standards are 
established, in part, based on a cost-benefit analysis or at 
least a consideration of cost .165 If a substance does not cause 
harm, the costs of treatment for its removal may not be jus-
tified .166 To be sure, someone must determine whether the 
substance causes sufficient environmental harm to warrant 
treatment costs . But that is a role that Congress assigned to 
EPA and its counterpart state agencies, not to the courts .167
163 . CWA §301(b) . For a quick review of the events leading up to the enactment 
of the CWA, see Environmental Prot. Agency v. California ex rel. State Water 
Resources Control Bd., 426 U .S . 200, 203-06, 6 ELR 20563 (1976) .
164 . As the Eighth Circuit said in Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist.v. Hoffman, 
597 F .2d 617, 627, 9 ELR 20334 (8th Cir . 1979):
Congress has, by the inclusion of certain substances in the defi-
nition of “pollutant”  .   .   . determined that the discharge of those 
substances in navigable waters is subject to the Act’s control require-
ments . The Act contains no provision that the listed substances are 
to be classified as pollutants and, thus subject to the Act’s control 
requirements, only upon a further administrative or judicial finding 
that their addition to navigable waters results in a significant de-
crease in water quality . Nor does the fact that the listed substances 
may not in themselves be commonly considered “toxic” or “con-
taminating” change this result .
165 . CWA §304(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B), & (b)(3)(B), 33 U .S .C . §1314(b)(1)(B), 
(b)(2)(B), & (b)(3)(B) .
166 . See Miller et al ., supra note 5, at 278-305 .
167 . An exception exists in judicial review of EPA’s promulgation of technology-
based standards, approval of state water quality standards, or issuance of a 
permit, where courts give substantial deference to EPA’s determinations .
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In conclusion, the plain meaning of the definition of 
pollutant includes almost all substances that may be added 
to water, making other interpretive devices unnecessary in 
almost all cases . For the few substances for which the out-
come is ambiguous, the broad general purpose of the CWA 
to attain and maintain water integrity may be a useful 
supplemental interpretive device in determining whether 
an environmentally harmful material is a pollutant . If a 
material does not cause pollution or interfere with water 
integrity, however, it is still a pollutant if it fits within the 
statutory definition .
E. Must Pollutants Be of Human Origin?
The Ninth Circuit’s Hammersley decision held that pol-
lutants must be wastes of human or industrial processes . 
The notion that a pollutant must be a waste was discussed, 
and dispelled, above . The notion that a pollutant must be 
the product of human or industrial processes is similarly 
wrong . The definition of pollutant contains no qualifica-
tion that a substance be the product of human or industrial 
activity . While the definition of “pollution” is limited to 
“man-made or man-induced alteration” of water quality,168 
pollution is not a jurisdictional limitation, and Congress 
decoupled the definitions of pollutant and pollution . The 
definitional list of pollutants includes substances that are 
not man-made (for example, rock and sand), although 
those substances may be added to navigable water as a 
result of human activity . But it is not necessary to contort 
the definition of pollutant to limit the CWA prohibition to 
the results of human activity, because the offense already 
includes “by any person” as a separate element . Insisting 
that pollutant in §502(6) requires human activity merely 
creates an unnecessary redundancy with the phrase “by 
any person” in §301(a) .
F. Potential Conflicts With Other CWA Sections
The CWA authorizes regulatory programs other than 
the §402 permit program . The §404 permit program for 
dredged and fill material has already been mentioned and 
is discussed immediately below in greater detail . Section 
311169 provides a comprehensive program to prevent spills 
of oil and hazardous materials, to remediate them when 
they occur, and to recover the government’s spill cleanup 
costs . The Oil Pollution Act,170 passed in the wake of the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill, has largely supplanted §311 . Section 
312 authorizes the U .S . Coast Guard to regulate the dis-
posal of untreated or inadequately treated sewage from ves-
sels into navigable waters . Nonpoint pollution sources are 
regulated, if at all, by states, under their own authorities, 
as encouraged by §319 . For the most part, these other pro-
168 . CWA §502(19) .
169 . 33 U .S .C . §1321 .
170 . Oil Pollution Act (OPA), 33 U .S .C . §§2701-2761, ELR Stat . OPA 
§§1001-7001 .
grams do not conflict with §402 or raise particular issues 
with regard to the definition of pollutant .
1. Section 311
In United States v. Hamel,171 the defendant appealed from 
a criminal conviction for spilling gasoline into Lake St . 
Claire in violation of §301(a), arguing that gasoline was not 
a pollutant under §502(6) because that statutory section 
did not list petroleum products . He further argued, apply-
ing the canon that a specific provision of a statute governs 
over a general provision of the same statute,172 that because 
§311 regulated oil spills and even defined “oil” in §311(a)
(1), oil was not a pollutant under §502(6) and oil spills 
were not included as violations of §301(a) . The government 
argued, and the district court held, that oil and gasoline 
fell within the category of “biological material” listed as a 
pollutant in §502(6) .173 The Sixth Circuit could easily have 
upheld the conviction on that basis . Instead, it undertook a 
longer but more specific analysis, finding that when Con-
gress enacted the CWA, it intended to include within the 
§402 permit program all discharges covered by the Refuse 
Act plus liquid waste from streets and sewers,174 and that 
the Supreme Court had held earlier, in United States v. 
Standard Oil Co.,175 that oil spills were discharges of refuse 
under the Refuse Act . Although those findings answered 
both of the defendant’s arguments, the court proceeded to 
demonstrate that there was no conflict between §§402 and 
311 in this regard, because they served different purposes . 
The purpose of the §402 permit program is to require pol-
lution reduction from ongoing discharges of pollutants, 
while the purpose of §311 is to prevent spills of pollutants 
and to remediate them when they occur .176 The court could 
have performed the same analysis, with the same result, if 
§311 had been a different statute (for example, the OPA) 
rather than a different section in the same statute .177
2. Section 404: Dredged and Fill Material
Section 301(a) prohibits the discharge of a pollutant, except 
in compliance with a §402 or §404 permit . Section 402 
authorizes EPA to issue permits for the discharge of a 
pollutant, and §404 authorizes the U .S . Army Corps of 
171 . 551 F .2d 107, 7 ELR 20253 (6th Cir . 1977) .
172 . See Eskridge, supra note 70, at 324, citing Green v . Bock Laundry Mach . 
Co ., 490 U .S . 504, 524-25 (1989); Scalia & Garner, supra note 12, at 
183-89 .
173 . Hamel, 551 F .2d at 110 .
174 . Id. at 110-11 .
175 . 384 U .S . 492 (1966) .
176 . Hamel, 551 F .2d 111-13 .
177 . Why would the court have taken such a round-about path to its conclusion, 
when it would have been far easier to hold that oil is a biological material, 
a listed category of pollutant? It might be explained by the fact that the 
decision was written during the heyday of using legislative history as an 
interpretive device . Eskridge, supra note 70, at 207-38; Scalia & Garner, 
supra note 12, at 369-90 . See, e.g., Train v . Colorado PIRG, 426 U .S . 1, 6 
ELR 20549 (1976) . The court may also have been hesitant to start down the 
biological material path, knowing full well that live fish and perhaps people 
lay ahead as pollutants .
Copyright © 2014 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
11-2014 NEWS & ANALYSIS 44 ELR 10975
Engineers (the Corps) to issue permits for the discharge of 
“dredged or fill material .” Many, if not most, courts con-
clude from this that dredged or fill material is a pollutant, 
in conclusory formulations such as that §301(a) “prohibits 
the discharge of any pollutant, including dredged or fill 
material .”178 A few courts mention §502(6) in support of 
the conclusion . These decisions, however, are in part either 
wrong or misleading . Section 301(a) does not define pollut-
ant, much less define it to include dredged or fill material . 
Section 502(6) defines pollutant to include “dredged spoil”; 
it does not define pollutant to include either “dredged or 
fill material” or “fill material .” The unstated reasoning of 
these decisions may be that because §301(a) prohibits the 
discharge of pollutants except in compliance with permits 
issued under §402 or §404, and because §404 authorizes 
the Corps to issue permits for the discharge of dredged or 
fill material, then dredged or fill material must be a pol-
lutant . This is circular reasoning . There would be no rea-
son for dischargers of dredged or fill materials to apply for 
§404 permits unless dredged or fill materials are pollutants, 
because their discharges without permit are not otherwise 
illegal under §301(a), §404, or any other provision of the 
CWA . But for the absence of dredged or fill material from 
the definition of pollutant in §502(6), the courts’ logic 
might be persuasive . But because the definition in §502(6) 
is exclusive, its failure to explicitly include “dredged or 
fill material” means that such material is not a pollutant 
unless it or its constituents are listed in the definition or 
fall within a category of materials listed in the definition .
Fortunately, the §502(6) definition of pollutant 
includes “dredged spoil,” a term practically synonymous 
with “dredged material .”179 Although there is no hint of 
“fill material” in the §502(6) definition, most fill material 
consists at least in part of one of the specific substances 
included in that definition (rock and sand), or a substance 
that is within one of the categories included in that defini-
tion (demolition debris that falls within the solid, indus-
trial or municipal waste categories) .180 Assuming that fill 
material is composed at least in part of pollutants, which 
agency should issue a permit for the discharge: EPA for the 
178 . Bersani v . EPA, 850 F .2d 36, 39, 18 ELR 20874 (2d Cir . 1988) . See also 
Leslie Salt Co . v . United States, 55 F .3d 1388, 1391, 25 ELR 21046 (9th 
Cir . 1995); Town of Norfolk v . Corps of Eng’rs, 968 F .2d 1438, 1445, 22 
ELR 21337 (1st Cir . 1992) (citing §502(6)); United States v . Brink, 795 
F . Supp . 2d 565, 575 (S .D . Tex . 2011); Gouger v . Corps of Eng’rs, 779 F . 
Supp . 2d 588, 603 (S .D . Tex . 2011); Alabama Rivers Alliance, Inc . v . Corps 
of Eng’rs, 697 F . Supp . 2d 1251, 1258 (N .D . Ala . 2009); D’Olive Bay Res-
toration and Preservation Committee, Inc . v . Corps of Eng’rs, 513 F . Supp . 
2d 1261, 1268 (S .D . Ala . 2007); Florida Wildlife Fed’n v . U .S . Army Corps 
of Eng’rs, 401 F . Supp . 2d 1298, 1308 (S .D . Fla . 2005) (under §502(6) 
“dredged or fill materials are pollutants”); City of Shoreacres v . Waterworth, 
332 F . Supp . 2d 992, 1015 (S .D . Tex . 2004); National Wildlife Federation 
v . Norton, 332 F . Supp . 2d 170, 185 (D .D .C . 2004) . Contra, see Kentuck-
ians for Commonwealth, Inc . v . Rivenburgh, 204 F . Supp . 2d 927, 932, n .5 
(S .D . W . Va . 2002), labeling this as circular reasoning, rev’d on other grounds, 
317 F .3d 425 (4th Cir . 2003) .
179 . In United States v. Wilson, 133 F .3d 251, 259, 28 ELR 20299 (4th Cir . 
1997), the court commented that while “the statutory term ‘dredged spoil’ 
carries with it a more pejorative connotation than does the term the court 
used [in its jury instructions], ‘dredged material,’ the two are not sufficiently 
different to constitute error .”
180 . United States v . Pozsgai, 999 F .2d 719, 23 ELR 21012 (3d Cir . 1993) .
discharge of the included pollutants or the Corps for the 
discharge of the fill material?181 The interpretive canon that 
the specific statutory provision governs over the general 
provision182 suggests that when a broadly defined pollutant 
is also a narrowly defined “fill material,” then the more spe-
cific §404 governs, authorizing the Corps to issue a permit 
for the discharge of the fill material, rather than authoriz-
ing EPA to issue a permit for the discharge of a pollutant 
included in the fill material . Section 402(a) confirms this 
by granting EPA authority to issue permits for the dis-
charge of pollutants, “[e]xcept as provided in” §404 . This 
leaves the Corps as the agency issuing permits for the dis-
charge of dredged and fill material, and EPA as the Agency 
issuing permits for the discharge of all other pollutants .
That was the conclusion reached by courts considering 
the matter, including the Supreme Court in Coeur Alaska, 
Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council.183 In Coeur 
Alaska, environmental petitioners sought judicial review 
of a §404 permit authorizing the discharge of a slurry of 
30% crushed rock and 70% water from a gold-mining 
operation184 into a 23-acre lake that all parties agreed was 
navigable water . The operation would allow the solids to 
separate from the slurry by settling to the bottom of the 
lake, eventually filling all of the natural lake and more 
than doubling its surface . The operation would build a dam 
across the outlet from the lake, preventing the slurry water 
from flowing downstream without treatment . EPA issued 
a §402 permit imposing effluent limitations requiring the 
treatment of water flowing downstream from the dam . The 
Corps issued a §404 permit to fill the lake . Environmental 
petitioners contended that discharging pollutants into the 
lake required a §402 permit, not a §404 permit . The Ninth 
Circuit agreed, but the Supreme Court reversed .
Section 402 permits issued by EPA or states with 
approved programs, and §404 permits issued by the Corps 
or states with approved programs, are subject to very dif-
ferent conditions and limitations . Section 402 permits 
impose limitations on the discharge of pollutants requiring 
pollution reduction reflecting the application of the best 
available treatment technology and meeting state-devel-
oped water quality standards . Section 404 permits do not 
require pollution reduction, but may impose conditions on 
authorized projects to protect the environment . The Corps 
may also condition or deny permits when a public inter-
est review determines that their negative environmental 
impacts outweigh any social or economic benefit . Thus, 
whether particular pollutants are “dredged or fill material” 
181 . Justice Stephen Breyer explores this issue in his concurring opinion in Coeur 
Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U .S . 261, 292-93 
(2009) (Breyer, J ., concurring) .
182 . Eskridge, supra note 70, at 324, citing Green v . Bock Laundry Mach . Co ., 
490 U .S . 504, 524-25 (1989); Crawford Fitting Co . v . J .T . Gibbons, Inc ., 
482 U .S . 437 (1987); Scalia & Garner, supra note 12, at 183-89 .
183 . 557 U .S . 261 (2009) . See also Resource Invs ., Inc . v . U .S . Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 151 F .3d 1162, 28 ELR 21407 (9th Cir . 1998); Greenfield Mills, 
Inc . v . Macklin, 361 F .3d 934, 946 (7th Cir . 2004); United States v . United 
Homes, Inc ., 1999 WL 117701 (N .D . Ill . 1999) .
184 . The operation re-refined previously processed ore by crushing it and treating 
it with a chemical bath to float and recover remaining gold .
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makes a tremendous difference in the viability of the oper-
ation producing the pollutants and the environmental pro-
tection afforded the receiving water . Covering streams and 
filling valleys with mining overburden may be authorized 
by a Corps §404 permit if the overburden is “fill material .” 
But the same operation would probably be stymied if the 
pollutants discharged to the streams first had to meet tech-
nology-based and water quality standards under an EPA-
issued §402 permit .185 In Coeur Alaska, for instance, if a 
§402 permit was required, the particular mining operation 
would have been subject to a new source performance stan-
dard of zero discharge of pollutants .186 Under the circum-
stances, however, the tailings pond technology on which 
the standard was justified would have resulted in a greater 
loss of wetlands and natural habitat .187
The CWA does not define dredged material . Although 
CWA §502(6) defines pollutant to include dredged spoil, 
the statute does not define dredged spoil . EPA and the 
Corps both define dredged material to mean “material 
that is excavated or dredged from the waters of the United 
States .”188 As the concept of navigable waters expands to 
include wetlands, the question arises whether digging in 
a wetland requires a §404 permit . Because §404 requires 
a permit for discharging dredged material into a wetland, 
not for removing it from a wetland,189 however, those issues 
revolve around whether particular movements of soil and 
vegetation in wetlands during landclearing operations con-
stitute addition .190
The CWA does not define fill material . EPA and the 
Corps both define the term to mean “material placed in the 
waters of the United States where the material has the effect 
of: (i) Replacing any portion of a water body with dry land; 
or (ii) Changing the bottom elevation of any portion of the 
water of the United States .”191 The definitions give inclusive 
examples of “rock, sand, soil, clay, plastics, construction 
debris, wood chips, overburden from mining or other exca-
vation activities, and materials used to create any structure 
or infrastructure in the waters of the United States .” Both 
definitions specifically exclude “trash or garbage,” which 
neither EPA nor the Corps defines . The Corps earlier 
defined fill material to mean “any material used for the 
primary purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry land 
of or changing the bottom elevation of a [ ] water body .” 
That definition excluded pollutants discharged “primarily 
to dispose of waste” (not just trash and garbage), an activity 
it acknowledged was regulated under CWA §402 .192 The 
newer rule has the virtue of being objective rather than 
depending on the discharger’s state of mind . However, the 
newer definition creates a giant loophole allowing all sorts 
185 . See Coeur Alaska, 557 U .S . 261; Kentuckians for Commonwealth, Inc . v . 
Rivenburgh, 317 F .3d 425 (4th Cir . 2003) .
186 . Coeur Alaska, 557 U .S . at 266 .
187 . Id . at 269-70 .
188 . 33 C .F .R . §323 .2(c) and 40 C .F .R . §232 .2 .
189 . Save Our Community v . U .S . EPA, 971 F .2d 1995 (5th Cir . 2002); Orleans 
Audubon Society v . Lee, 742 F .2d 901, 15 ELR 20030 (5th Cir . 1984) .
190 . For a discussion of the “addition” element, see Miller, supra note 6 .
191 . 33 C .F .R . §323 .2(e) and 40 C .F .R . §232 .2 .
192 . 42 Fed . Reg . 37122, 37145 (July 19, 1977); 33 C .F .R . §323 .2(m) (1978) .
of waste (excepting only trash and garbage) disposal into 
water under the guise of filling the water or changing its 
bottom elevation .193
While typical municipal and industrial wastewaters are 
primarily liquid, they also have solid components that can 
settle out on the bottom of the receiving water and change 
its elevation, although that is more likely to occur in qui-
escent rather than in turbulent water . Indeed, in Rapanos 
v. United States, the Supreme Court toyed with the idea 
that liquid effluents are pollutants subject to §402 permits, 
while solids are fill material subject to §404 permits .194 The 
Court stated that “‘dredged or fill material’  .  .  . unlike tra-
ditional water pollution, are solids that do not readily wash 
downstream .”195 The plaintiffs in Coeur Alaska argued that 
this created a huge loophole in the CWA, and the Supreme 
Court dissent agreed .196 Any industrial wastewater with 
solids in it could be classified as “fill material” if the sol-
ids can accumulate on and eventually raise the level of the 
water bottom . That could effectively remove large segments 
of industry from the water pollution abatement require-
ments of the CWA §402 program .197 The argument was 
weakened in Coeur Alaska, however, because EPA and the 
Corps agreed that the fill project at issue was governed by 
§404, and their regulations provided that mining overbur-
den was fill material . Moreover, EPA and the Corps treated 
the altered lake as a treatment facility by requiring a §402 
permit at the outlet of the lake into a navigable river . The 
Court majority acknowledged the potential loophole, but 
left the question for another day, if and when EPA and the 
Corps agreed that other, more obnoxious industrial waste 
was fill material .198 In any event, the Court pointed out 
that EPA could veto Corps permits under §404(c) .
193 . Neither the older nor the newer version of the definition deals comfortably 
with the construction in a wetland of a sanitary landfill for the disposal of 
municipal solid waste . Under either definition, the placement of trash and 
garbage is excluded from fill material, so that a §402 permit rather than a 
§404 permit would be required for the operation of the facility . But the con-
struction of the bottom liners and leachate collection systems of the landfill 
would seem to fit within the definition of fill material, requiring a §404 
permit for its construction . Because construction of municipal landfilling 
wetlands is directly regulated by Subtitle D of RCRA, however, the Ninth 
Circuit has ruled that it is not regulated by CWA §404 . See Resource Invs ., 
Inc . v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 151 F .3d 1162, 28 ELR 21407 (9th Cir . 
1998) .
194 . “[T]he deposit of mobile pollutants into upstream ephemeral channels 
is naturally described as an ‘addition  .   .   . to navigable waters,’ 33 U .S .C . 
§1362(12), while the deposit of stationary fill material generally is not .” 
Rapanos v . United States, 547 U .S . 715, 745 n .11, 36 ELR 20116 (2006) .
195 . Id. at 723 .
196 . Coeur Alaska, Inc . v . Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U .S . 
261, 302-03 (2009) .
197 . EPA commonly regulates total suspended solids . See, e.g., best practicable 
treatment technology for the Rayon Fibers Subcategory of the Organic 
Chemicals, Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Effluent Guidelines, 40 C .F .R . 
§414 .21 .
198 . Coeur Alaska, 557 U .S . at 275-76 . The mining company in that case pro-
posed to treat mining waste by turning a wilderness lake into a settling 
basin . It applied to the Corps for a §404 permit to fill the lake and to EPA 
for a §402 permit to discharge water from the lake to the stream originally 
draining the lake . At the termination of mining activity, the company would 
restore the lake . The alternative was to build a settlement basin of consid-
erable height and extent that would not have to be deconstructed at the 
termination of operations . EPA, the Corps, and the Supreme Court major-
ity seemed to think the proposal was the better alternative . Id. at 269-70. 
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The distinction between whether material discharged to 
water is subject to a §402 or a §404 permit is easy in most 
cases . The discharge of effluent containing pollutants, such 
as PCBs, is regulated under §402 because the main impact 
of the discharge is on public health and water quality . The 
discharge of soil to extend a building lot into a river is reg-
ulated under §404 because its impact is on the navigability 
of the river . However, if the PCBs are attached to solids in a 
liquid effluent, under the current regulatory definition, the 
discharge is arguably regulated under §404, because if the 
solids accumulate, they can change the bottom elevation 
of the receiving water . Treating toxic solids as fill material 
subject to a §404 permit, however, ignores the differences 
between the purposes and operations of the two sections . 
The confusion may be the inevitable consequence of mix-
ing water pollution control regulation with water projects 
regulation, but EPA and the Corps could eliminate confu-
sion and ambiguity by a more careful phrasing of their 
regulations . Indeed, EPA and the Corps should return to 
their earlier regulatory definitions of fill material, because 
those earlier definitions better track differences between 
the intended purposes of §402 and §404 .
G. Potential Conflicts With Other Statutes
Special care is needed to interpret a statute in cases where 
another statute may apply to the same fact pattern, espe-
cially if an interpretation of one statute may interfere with 
achieving the purposes of the other statute . In these cases, 
common wisdom cautions to read the statutes harmoni-
ously with each other, and certainly canons of statutory 
construction require a harmonious reading .199 Pollution 
control statutes create this type of problem because they 
normally protect a single environmental medium (air, land, 
or water) from contamination, whereas pollutants tend to 
migrate between environmental media . For instance, a 
power plant’s air pollution, which is regulated by the Clean 
Air Act (CAA),200 not only fouls the air, but may also be 
redeposited by gravity or precipitation onto land or water . 
Indeed, air emissions from coal-burning power plants have 
long been known as the primary sources of acid deposi-
tion in the northeastern United States and neighboring 
Canada, causing both acid rain and acid runoff into lakes 
and other surface water .201 Air pollution from such sources 
It goes without saying that the best environmental alternative would have 
been to have neither the settlement basin nor the flooded lake .
199 . Statutes are to be interpreted in pari materia to avoid conflicts . See Es-
kridge, supra note 70, at 327, citing Morales v . TWA, Inc ., 112 S . Ct . 2031 
(1992); TWA, Inc . v . Independent Fed’n of Flight Attendants, 489 U .S . 426 
(1989); Scalia & Garner, supra note 12, at 252-55 .
200 . Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U .S .C . §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat . CAA 
§§101-618 .
201 . The problem led to the amendment of the CAA to include the Acid Depo-
sition Program, creating a national cap-and-trade program for the reduc-
tion of sulfur oxide emissions from large sources . See CAA §§402-416, 42 
U .S .C . §§7651a-7651o . Acid deposition is not the only such interstate 
transport problem . “Burning coal is the main source of mercury generation 
in our [Great Lakes] region and atmospheric deposition of mercury into 
the Great Lakes from coal accounts for seventy five percent of those highly 
toxic compounds .” Kendra Fogarty et al ., Emerging Legal Issues in the Great 
could theoretically be regulated by land and water pollu-
tion statutes as well as by an air pollution statute . Pollu-
tion control statutes that regulate particular substances (for 
example, PCBs) create the same sorts of problems .202 Such 
substances are ubiquitous in the environment and poten-
tially fall within the purview of the multiple environmental 
media-oriented statutes . Because EPA administers most of 
these statutes, it can often implement or interpret them to 
avoid significant conflicts . Conflicts between EPA-admin-
istered statutes may reach the courts when environmental 
advocates either challenge an EPA regulation attempting to 
resolve an interstatute conflict or sue a violator of one envi-
ronmental statute who defends by alleging that another 
environmental statute authorized its actions .203 Statutes 
administered by other agencies lead to the same types of 
conflict, with less opportunity or incentive for EPA to 
avoid the conflict .
1. Atomic Energy Act
The first such conflict under the definition of pollut-
ant arose because Congress defined pollutant in CWA 
§502(6) to include “radioactive materials,” while Con-
gress had earlier established a “pervasive regulatory 
scheme”204 for source, byproducts, and special nuclear 
materials under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA),205 admin-
istered by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) or later 
the Nuclear Energy Regulatory Commission and the 
U .S . Department of Energy . If the CWA authorized EPA 
to regulate radioactive discharges from nuclear power 
plants, the AEC would have lost significant author-
ity over the development of nuclear power for peaceful 
use . EPA defined pollutant to exclude material “regu-
lated under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 .”206 An envi-
ronmental group challenged this exclusion in Colorado 
PIRG .207 The Supreme Court ruled that the CWA’s legis-
lative history made explicit that Congress did not intend 
EPA to regulate source, byproduct, and special nuclear 
Lakes Such as the Public Trust Doctrine, Subterranean Rights, and Municipal 
Regulatory Arrangements., 34 Can .-U .S . L .J . 279, 309 (2010) .
202 . Regulated by the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U .S .C . §§2601-
2692, ELR Stat . TSCA §§2-412 . See 15 U .S .C . §2605(e) .
203 . Environmental plaintiffs have attempted to bring CWA citizen suits against 
air pollution sources when their air pollutants eventually enter water . The 
courts have summarily held that air pollution is regulated by the CAA, 
not by the CWA . See, e.g., Chemical Weapons Working Grp . v . Dep’t of 
Army, 111 F .3d 1485, 1490-91, 27 ELR 21130 (10th Cir . 1997); see also 
U .S . EPA ex rel . McKeown v . Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 
162 F . Supp . 2d 173, 189 (S .D .N .Y . 2001) . Environmental plaintiffs also 
challenged EPA’s attempts to reconcile the CWA with RCRA in Chemical 
Waste Mgmt. v. U.S. EPA, 976 F .2d 2, 23 ELR 20024 (D .C . Cir . 1992), and 
RCRA with the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U .S .C . §§300f to 300j-26, 
ELR Stat . SDWA §§1401-1465, in NRDC v. U.S. EPA, 907 F .2d 1146, 20 
ELR 21274 (D .C . Cir . 1990) .
204 . Train v . Colorado PIRG, 426 U .S . 1, 24, 6 ELR 20549 (1976) .
205 . Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, 42 U .S .C . §§2114 .
206 . 40 C .F .R . §22 .2 .
207 . 426 U .S . 1 . The challenge took the form of a citizen suit against EPA for 
failing to carry out a mandatory duty . The challenge, however, should have 
been for judicial review of EPA’s exclusionary regulation . EPA had per-
formed its mandatory duty of promulgating regulations establishing the 
§402 regulations; the plaintiff objected to the terms of those regulations .
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materials,208 although this did not rule out EPA authority 
over other water pollutants discharged by nuclear power 
plants, such as heat . Another environmental group later 
filed suit against a mining company for its discharge of 
uranium mill tailings into navigable water, with the same 
outcome in the Ninth Circuit for the same reasoning .209 
These decisions both ignore the canon that the later stat-
ute governs over the earlier statute;210 Congress enacted 
the CWA in 1972, 18 years after the 1954 enactment of 
the AEA .211 The decisions could have relied on the canon 
that the specific governs over the general, for the AEA’s 
jurisdiction over “source, by-product and special nuclear 
materials”212 is more specific than the CWA’s jurisdiction 
over pollutants or over radioactive materials generally . 
All of these canons, however, can be seen as shortcuts to 
determine legislative intent, and in this case, legislative 
intent on the issue was directly addressed by persuasive 
legislative history .213 It is worth noting that the Colorado 
PIRG decision was written in the heyday of judicial use 
of legislative history as an interpretive method, a practice 
that has been much curtailed in more recent years214 in 
favor of an emphasis on plain meaning .
2. FIFRA
The most widespread and considered cases of conflict 
between EPA-administered statutes are between the CWA 
and FIFRA . FIFRA pervasively regulates consumer prod-
ucts; pesticides cannot be manufactured, sold, or used 
until they are registered by EPA . Registration establishes 
the uses to which pesticides may be put and the means 
by which they can be applied for those uses . The uses 
allowed and the application directions are calculated to 
208 . Colorado PIRG, 426 U .S . at 10-23 .
209 . Waste Action Project v . Dawn Mining Corp ., 137 F .3d 1426, 28 ELR 
21035 (9th Cir . 1998) . The Ninth Circuit also considered the applicability 
of the Uranium Mill Tailings Regulation Control Act .
210 . Where a later statute conflicts with an earlier statute, it impliedly repeals the 
earlier statute to the extent of the conflict . See, e.g., Dorsey v . United States, 
132 S . Ct . 2321, 2332 (2012) .
211 . Oct . 18, 1972, Pub . L . No . 92-500 (CWA); Aug . 30, 1954, Pub . L . No . 
85-256 (AEA) .
212 . The Court in Colorado PIRG reviews the legislative history, including 
explicit statements in the reports on the bill by both the responsible Sen-
ate and U .S . House of Representatives Committees, colloquies on the 
floors of both chambers, and the defeat in the House of an amendment 
to give states authority to regulate radioactive discharges . See 426 U .S . at 
11-24 . The Court found particularly persuasive an extensive dialogue on 
the Senate floor between Senator Muskie, chief sponsor and author of the 
CWA, and Sen . John Pastore (D-R .I .), Chair of the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy .
213 . The Court held that the legislative history supported the “intent to pre-
serve the pre-existing regulatory plan .” 426 U .S . at 24 . Textualists argue 
that interpretation is not directed at discerning legislative intent, but only at 
discerning what the statute means . See Scalia & Garner, supra note 12, at 
391-96 (discovering legislative intent included as one of treatise’s “Thirteen 
Falsities Exposed”) .
214 . The author’s research has found that legislative history was used in 42% of 
the decisions interpreting pollutant decided in 1982 or earlier, but in only 
11% of such decisions decided after 1982 . Much of the reason for the shift 
away from reliance on legislative history was the influence of the new textu-
alists on the courts and in academia . One treatise traces the ebb and flow of 
the Supreme Court’s use of legislative history to support or escape the plain 
meaning of a statute . See Eskridge, supra note 70, at 207-38 .
avoid danger to public health and unintended215 danger 
to the environment . Thus, FIFRA registration establishes 
whether pesticides can be applied over or near water and, if 
so, the FIFRA-approved label establishes how they must be 
applied over or near water .
As discussed above, several CWA decisions concern the 
application of pesticides on, in, or near water . Headwa-
ters was the first of the court of appeals decisions and the 
only one directly considering a potential conflict between 
FIFRA and the CWA and the consequent need to read 
the statutes harmoniously . Headwaters concluded that the 
statutes did not conflict because they served different pur-
poses . The Ninth Circuit noted that FIFRA established a 
“nationally uniform labeling system to regulate pesticide 
use,” based on a national cost/benefit analysis weighing the 
benefits of using the pesticide against the adverse environ-
mental effects of doing so .216 Congress made no effort in 
FIFRA to ensure that individual applications of pesticides 
were compatible with local conditions . On the other hand, 
CWA requires that §402 permits contain effluent limita-
tions designed to achieve local water quality standards, 
preventing local environmental harm from individual dis-
chargers, as well as to achieve national technology-based 
standards . The Headwaters court concluded that these 
were compatible goals and that FIFRA registration did not 
foreclose requiring a CWA permit for discharging chemi-
cal wastes .217
The issue of a conflict between FIFRA and the CWA 
did not arise in the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent Fairhurst 
decision218 because the pesticide applied in that case was a 
chemical leaving no waste or excess in the water, so there 
was no chemical waste and hence no pollutant . The court 
erroneously noted, however, that the necessity to read the 
CWA and FIFRA harmoniously was required by the Ninth 
Circuit’s earlier holding in Headwaters. The Sixth Circuit 
did not reconsider the issue in National Cotton Council.219
3. Refuse Act
The CWA §402 permit program was based on the Refuse 
Act Permit Program, developed by EPA and the Corps 
under the Refuse Act .220 Congress took care in the CWA 
to reconcile the two statutes . Sections 402(a)(4) and (5) 
provide that no Refuse Act permits for discharges of refuse 
into navigable waters can be issued after the enactment of 
the CWA, but that applications for Refuse Act permits 
filed before the date of that enactment were deemed to be 
applications for CWA §402 permits . Moreover, Refuse Act 
permits issued before that date were deemed to be CWA 
§402 permits, and CWA §402 permits were deemed to 
215 . It goes without saying that the very purpose of pesticides is to damage spe-
cific living parts of the environment .
216 . Headwaters, Inc . v . Talent Irrigation Dist ., 243 F .3d 526, 532, 31 ELR 
20535 (9th Cir . 2001) .
217 . Id . at 531-32 .
218 . 422 F .3d 1146 (9th Cir . 2005) .
219 . National Cotton Council of Am . v . U .S . EPA, 553 F .3d 927, 39 ELR 20006 
(6th Cir . 2009) .
220 . 33 U .S .C . §407 .
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be Refuse Act permits . Finally, CWA §402(k) provided a 
grace period until the earlier of: (1) the end of 1974 for a 
permit applicant filing a timely application under §402 or 
the Refuse Act; or (2) until a permit was issued or denied . 
Although these measures eliminated conflict between 
CWA §402 and the Refuse Act, defendants from time to 
time have attempted unsuccessfully to obfuscate the appli-
cability of the CWA by invoking the Refuse Act .221
The Refuse Act is one section of the Rivers and Harbors 
Act of 1899, which includes §403222 requiring a permit 
from the Corps to dredge in navigable waters . Dredging 
produces dredged material or dredged spoil that must be 
disposed . If dredged material was disposed elsewhere in 
navigable water prior to 1972, a Refuse Act permit was 
required . In 1972, CWA §404 authorized the Corps to 
issue permits for the discharge of dredged and fill mate-
rial into navigable waters, a function it performed ear-
lier under the Refuse Act . Oddly, §404 did not contain 
the same sort of provisions as §402 for meshing the new 
permitting authority with the earlier Refuse Act . CWA 
§511(a), however, provided generally that the CWA did 
not supersede the authority of the Corps “to maintain 
navigation” and specifically that a §404 permit “shall be 
conclusive as to the effect on water quality of any dis-
charge resulting from any activity subject to section 403 
(ocean discharge) of this title .”
IV. Conclusion
“Pollutant” is not a limiting element of the water pollu-
tion offense . Congress intended the element to reach 
broadly, and it does; its statutory definition encompasses 
virtually all residuals and byproducts of human activity 
as well as biological materials . Courts have only held that 
seven substances discharged to water by human activity do 
not fall within the statutory definition of pollutant, and 
there are contrary opinions concerning four of those seven 
substances . Moreover, the rulings that most of the seven 
substances are not pollutants were predicated on the argu-
ment that their addition to water was governed by another 
statute rather than on the argument that they did not fit 
within the definition of pollutant .
Perhaps, because of the broad plain meaning of the stat-
utory definition of pollutant, there were relatively few judi-
cial challenges to the interpretation of the element . Courts 
resolved those challenges fairly easily by reference to the 
plain meaning of its statutory definition, or, after time, by 
reference to precedents based on the plain meaning of the 
definition of the element . The author’s research has found 
that courts relied on other canons of statutory construc-
tion only to a minor extent to interpret pollutant . Indeed, 
courts have used only 10 canons beyond plain meaning 
and precedent to interpret “pollutant,” and the courts cited 
plain meaning and precedent virtually as many times as 
221 . See, e.g., United States v . Hamel, 551 F .2d 107, 112, 7 ELR 20253 (6th Cir . 
1977) .
222 . 33 U .S .C . §403 .
they cited the remaining canons in the aggregate . Most 
courts recognized that Congress decoupled the meanings 
of pollutant and pollution in the CWA and that a pollutant 
under the statute does not have to cause pollution . More-
over, a substance does not have to result from human activ-
ity to be a pollutant .
The main problem with the definition of pollutant is 
that its plain meaning sometimes seems to reach too far . 
Most questionable results from that, however, are blunted 
because the finding that a substance is a pollutant has no 
legal effect unless all of the other elements of the water 
pollution offense are also found . Even so, there are a few 
specific areas in which congressional or EPA action is war-
ranted . Most follow from the definition listing categories 
of substances denominated both “material” and “waste,” 
with no apparent reason for the distinction . Why did 
Congress include all biological material, but only chemi-
cal, solid, industrial, and municipal waste? The inclusion 
of all biological material leads to the absurd result that 
propagating native fish in a hatchery and adding them to 
a fishing stream can violate the CWA without a permit . 
The same problem would occur for other biological mate-
rial; for example, for planting wild rice or eel grass where 
they have been depleted by human activity . Congress 
could easily deal with this issue by a surgical amendment 
changing “biological material” in CWA §502(6) to “bio-
logical wastes .” Alternatively, EPA could address the issue 
by defining “biological material” to exclude “indigenous 
fish or biota,” or by issuing a general permit or a permit 
by regulation authorizing such discharges under appropri-
ate conditions; for example, where the fish are native spe-
cies rather than introduced species . Similar solutions are 
possible for analogous reductio ad absurdum situations; for 
example, people conveyed to navigable waters from diving 
boards or water slides .
More difficult are the statute’s and EPA’s failures to 
define waste, in particular the failure to address the issue of 
whether products designed for use on or in water become 
wastes when their useful life is spent . Positioning a shot-
gun to fire every half hour over (and therefore into) a body 
of water is a classical addition of pollutants into navigable 
water from a point source without a permit . However, if 
that shotgun is fired only for the purpose of killing ducks 
when they fly into its trajectory, it is not an addition of 
pollutants even when some or all of the shot misses the 
ducks and falls into the water . Variants of this fact pat-
tern are limited only by the imagination: Examples include 
spraying pesticide on mosquito larvae in water or spray-
ing paint on a bridge .223 EPA’s reaction when faced with 
such situations is to promulgate a rule exempting the dis-
charges resulting from such activities from requiring §402 
permits, a strategy that courts have rejected as contrary to 
the CWA . EPA might be more successful promulgating a 
223 . These two examples illustrate the difficulty in this task, because pesticides 
cannot be sprayed on aquatic pests without spraying waste or residue pesti-
cides in the water, while properly placed plastic barriers can collect sprayed 
paint that misses the bridge and prevent it from entering the water .
Copyright © 2014 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
44 ELR 10980 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 11-2014
regulatory definition of waste, as it has done under RCRA 
generally,224 or for particular substances, such as military 
munitions .225 Alternatively, it could issue a permit by rule 
or authorize states with approved programs to issue permits 
by rule for such categories of discharges .
The distinction between pollutants subject to §402 per-
mits and dredged and fill material subject to §404 permits 
is also problematic because “fill material” does not appear 
in the statutory list of substances that are “pollutants,” 
although most fill material does fall within one of the cat-
egories of substances that are listed in those statutory cat-
224 . 40 C .F .R . §261 .2 .
225 . 40 C .F .R . §266 .202, which survived judicial review in Military Toxics Project 
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a. Plus (+) denotes an environmental positive decision in terms of defining “pollutant,” i.e., an expansive interpretation. Minus (-) denotes an environmental 
negative decision, a restrictive interpretation. NOTE, even though the decision on the definition of “pollutant” may be expansive, the environmental party 
may have lost the case.
b. Cit. S. means citizens suit; Crim. means criminal prosecution; Enf. means civil enforcement action; Jud. Rev. means judicial review.
c. 1. Avoid absurd results; 2. Broad interpretation to effectuate statutory purpose; 3. Deference to agency interpretation of statute; 4. Ejusdem generis; 5. Ex-
ception proves the rule; 6. Exclusive/inclusive nature of definition; 7. Plain meaning; 8. Legislative history; 9. Harmonize with other statutes; 10. Precedent; 
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d. A. acid mine drainage; B. air pollutants; C. blood; D. cement; E. changes in water quality; F. chemical wastes, including chlorine residue and alum floc; G. de-
molition debris; H. dredged or fill material; I. fish, fish parts, and fish feces; J. listed toxics; K. manure; L. municipal solid waste; M. munitions; N. pesticides; 
O. petroleum derivatives; P. produced water; Q. radioactive waste; R. rock, sand, and sediment; S. sewage; T. stormwater; U. soil and vegetation.
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